United States v. Bailey’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

118 federal appellate · 3 district · 21 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 159 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““§ 5.4 Length of Deliberations; deadlocked Jury. “(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give an instruction which informs the jury : (i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree thereto; (ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it can be done without violence to individual judgment; (iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with his fellow jurors; (iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not hesitate to reexamine his own views and change his opinion if convinced it is erroneous ; and (v) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. “(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to agree, the court may require the jury to continue their deliberations and may give or repeat an instruction as provided in subsection (a). The court shall not require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals. “(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable probability of agreement.””

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. United States v. Beattie · 19 Cal. 3d 835 - People v. Gainer

2. ““(1) The District of Columbia Circuit has exercised its supervisory jurisdiction to abolish Allen and has replaced it with the ABA standard. See United States v. Thomas, 1971, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 101 , 449 F.2d 1177, 1187 (en banc). (2) The First Circuit has said that the dynamite charge ‘should be used with great caution, and only when absolutely necessary.’ United States v. Flannery, 1 Cir. 1971, 451 F.2d 880, 883 . Although it did not require trial courts to employ the ABA standard, the First Circuit effectively ordered that if Allen charges are to be used, the Allen language must be precisely followed. (3) The Second Circuit has such ‘grave doubts’ about Allen that it has given notice that it will not tolerate the slightest deviation from the approved language; furthermore, the Court stated that it permitted Allen to stand only by ‘the barest margin.’ See United States v. Kenner, 2 Cir. 1965, 354 F.2d 780, 782-784 . (4) The Third Circuit has flatly abolished the dynamite charge. ‘Hereafter this court will not let a verdict stand which may have been influenced in any way by an Allen Charge.’ United States v. Fioravanti, 3 Cir. 1969, 412 F.2d 407, 420 . (5) The Fourth Circuit has for a decade refused to allow trial judges to depart in the least from the language of the Allen case itself. See United States v. Rogers, 4 Cir. 1961, 289 F.2d 433 . (6) The Sixth Circuit has reversed convictions where only the slightest addition to the original Allen charge was made. See, e. g., Uni”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. United States v. Scott · 375 F. Supp. 1271 - Ralls v. Manson

3. ““These instructions were quite lengthy and were, in substance, that in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not be expected; that although the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the question submitted with candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of each other; that it was their duty to decide the case if they could conscientiously do so; that they should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other’s arguments; that, if much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no impression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. If, upon the other hand, the majority was for acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not concurred in by the majority.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. United States v. Fields · United States v. Hill