Kim v. Gonzales’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

13 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In all events, we conclude that it would not matter even if [the alien’s] actions in this instance could be considered a crime of moral turpitude as well as an aggravated felony and crime of violence. As we read section 212(c), what the Attorney General had authority to waive, under certain conditions and before section 212(e)’s repeal, were particular grounds of exclusion; ... But, as we have noted, there is no waiver authority for one who is excluded as an ‘aggravated felon’ or one who commits a ‘crime of violence’ (these not being grounds of exclusion). So it is beside the point that a different ground of deportation {e.g., the “crimes of moral turpitude” ground) might have been waived if it also had been invoked against him. If someone was found de-portable on two different grounds, waiver of one would hardly avoid the other— for which waiver had not or could not be invoked.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Thap v. Mukasey · Dalombo Fontes v. Gonzales

2. “`[A]ggravated felony' and `crime of violence,' although statutory grounds for deportation under specified conditions, were not themselves statutory grounds for exclusion; therefore the exclusion statute does not provide authority for waivers corresponding to those grounds.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Leroy Blake v. John P. Carbone, Field Officer Director of New York City, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Michael Chertoff, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, Michael J. Garcia, Assistant Secretary (Designee), United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Errol Anthony Foster, Also Known as Errol Foster, Also Known as Errol A. Foster v. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, Aundre Singh v. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States, Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Department of Homeland Security, Ho Yoon Chong v. Attorney General of the United States · Blake v. Carbone

3. “468 F.3d at 63 (emphasis in original). 32 Finally, as noted, section 212(c) was part of a scheme that juxtaposed various grounds for exclusion (listed in section 212(a)) with qualified authority of the Attorney General (described in section 212(c)) to waive individual grounds in the case of certain permanent residents who were seeking to reenter the country. Kim, 468 F.3d at 62. According to the Second Circuit's equal protection analysis, any statutory waiver opportunity available to an excludable person must be available to a deportable person. Francis, 532 F.2d at 273. But”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Dalombo Fontes v. Gonzales