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468 So. 2d 284

468 So.2d 284

10 Fla.L.Weekly 659

Docket Nos. AZ-188, AZ-189.

State v. Kahmke

STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Tommy T. KAHMKE, Appellee. STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Allan Leo TOON, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided March 14, 1985.

Rehearing Denied May 7, 1985.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1985-03-14

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“The decision to file a nol prosse is within the sole discretion of the state.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 506 So. 2d 462 - State v. Padron

Relies on 375 So. 2d 49 - State v. Braden · 208 So. 2d 156 - State v. Sokol · 277 So. 2d 543 - State v. Wells

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1985-03-14

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently August 2013

8 state decisions

301985199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*285 Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Barbara Ann Butler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jacksonville, for appellant.

¶2Michael L. Edwards and Gene T. Moss, Jacksonville, for appellee Tommy T. Kahmke.

¶3Lewis H. Buzzell, III, and Glenn K. Allen, Jacksonville, for appellee Allan Leo Toon.

¶4SHIVERS, Judge.

¶5The State appeals dismissal of information filed against each defendant. The appeal also raises, inter alia, the trial court's rulings on pretrial matters.

¶6These cases were consolidated for oral argument as the point on appeal in each case is identical.

¶7The defendants were charged in separate informations with the sale of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) in Duval County. Two key State witnesses were employed by the United States Navy Investigative Services (USNIS), but were shortly thereafter transferred from Duval County. Although the State attempted to furnish the defendants with current addresses and make the witnesses available for discovery, on the trial date, the defendants had not been able to depose these witnesses and the witnesses were not present. The trial court continued the case for one day at the State's request. The following day the trial court refused to continue the case for one week so the State could make these witnesses available, and granted the defendants' motions to exclude the testimony of these witnesses. The State thereupon entered a nolle prosequi (nolle prosse) in each case.

¶8Three days later the State filed informations against each of these defendants, the same as those originally filed.

¶9The defendants moved for a dismissal or imposition of sanctions at the arraignment, arguing that the State had in effect granted itself a continuance. The trial court agreed and dismissed the informations.

¶10The State appeals the dismissal of the new informations and also asserts the trial court abused its discretion in denying the State's motion for a continuance and in granting the defendants' motions for sanctions.

¶11The State had a right to nolle prosse. A nolle prosequi may be filed at any time prior to the swearing in of the jury. State v. Sokol,208 So.2d 156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). State v. Braden,375 So.2d 49 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Permission of the trial court is not necessary, because the decision to file a nolle prosse is within the sole discretion of the State. State v. Braden, supra, at 50; and State v. Wells,277 So.2d 543 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973).

¶12Since the actions of the State were authorized, it was an abuse of discretion to dismiss the informations.

¶13The sanctions excluding the witnesses do not carry over to the new proceedings, but the State is required to comply with any *286 appropriate discovery orders which may be entered.

¶14The dismissal of each case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

¶15REVERSED and REMANDED.

¶16BOOTH and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.

¶17

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

¶18SHIVERS, Judge.

¶19Appellee Toon has called our attention to the statement in our opinion that Mr. Toon moved for imposition of sanctions at arraignment on the second informations filed after the first informations were nolle prossed. Mr. Toon correctly asserts that he successfully moved to dismiss the second information at that time, but did not, at that time (May 3, 1984), request the imposition of sanctions. Mr. Toon's motion for the imposition of sanctions against the State was made on April 24, 1984, immediately following the trial court's denial of the State's motion for continuance.

¶20With this correction, we adhere to our original opinion and the motion for rehearing is DENIED.

¶21BOOTH and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.

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