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469 F.2d 675

Docket No. 72-2275.

Arunga v. Weldon

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided Nov. 15, 1972.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1972-11-15

Cited by 21 later decisions — most recently December 1978

7 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions

2 counsel of record

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Civil Rights Act of 1866) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Monroe v. Pape · David Moor v. Frank I. Madigan, William Donovan Rundle, Jr., a Minor, by William D. Rundle, His Guardian Ad Litem v. Frank I. Madigan · Jerry S. Diamond v. Peter J. Pitchess, Sheriff

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1972-11-15

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1James Aggrey-Kweggyirr Arunga, in pro. per.

¶2Frederick M. Cunningham, City Atty., Alameda, Cal., Peter W. Davis, of Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May, Oakland, Cal., for defendants-appellees.

¶3Before DUNIWAY, ELY and TRASK, Circuit Judges.

¶4PER CURIAM:

¶5The plaintiff filed an action against the City of Alameda alleging that he had been deprived of rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1986. The complaint was dismissed on motion upon the ground that the city is not a “person” and cannot be sued under the Civil Rights Act. An amended pleading based upon the same statute against the same defendant was again dismissed and this appeal taken.1

¶6It is abundantly clear that a municipal corporation is not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed. *6762d 492 (1961); Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972); Diamond v. Pitchess, 411 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1969). The district court was unquestionably correct and we affirm.

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