Joseph v. Coyle’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

61 federal appellate · 7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 129 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Gray v. Moore · Pudelski v. Wilson

2. “[Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Haliym v. Mitchell

3. “[i]n light of the clear line of precedent requiring proof that [the defendant] was the actual killer, the equally clear precedent that the actual-killer element requires proof that the defendant personally inflicted the .death blows in a situation where (as here) the defendant and a coconspirator are both present at the scene, and the total absence of such proof (accompanied by the state’s concession that it could not offer such proof, to boot), we conclude that the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision was an unreasonable application of the due-process standard of Jackson v. Virginia.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Morgan v. Dickhaut