Wright v. New Jersey’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 federal appellate · 3 district · 35 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 68 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The third essential element is that the defendant had possession of the weapon under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful uses as it may have. The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's possession of the [paintball gun] was under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful uses as it may have. It is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant formed an intent to use that object as a weapon. It is, however, necessary for the State to prove that it was possessed under such circumstances that a reasonable person would recognize that it was likely to be used as a weapon; in other words, under circumstances where it posed a likely threat of harm to others. You may consider factors such as the surrounding circumstances; size, shape and condition of the object, the nature of its concealment, the time, place and actions of the defendant when it was found in (his/her) possession to determine whether or not the object was manifestly appropriate for its lawful use. [(Emphasis added).]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 221 N.J. Super. 66 - State v. Blaine · 359 N.J. Super. 399 - State in Interest of GC

2. “We have “long recognized the the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is closely related to mens rea.” Colauetti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 [ 99 S.Ct. 675, 685 , 58 L.Ed.2d 596 ] (1979). See generally, United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 434-436 [ 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2872-73 , 57 L.Ed.2d 854 ] (1978). A statute that requires scienter “mitigate[s]” the vagueness of its other terms by helping to ensure that the defendant had adequate notice and by guarding against capricious enforcement through the requirement that he actually have intended the conduct which the statute seeks to guard against. Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 [ 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193 , 71 L.Ed.2d 362 ] (1982); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 111, 114 [ 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2301, 2302 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 ] (1972). The absence of such a requirement, on the other hand, enhances the risks of unfair notice and arbitrary enforcement. See e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-102 [ 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1035 , 89 L.Ed. 1495 ] (1945) (plurality opinion).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. United States v. Scanio

3. “the situation in which someone who has not yet formed an intent to use an object as a weapon possesses it under circumstances in which it is likely to be so used. The obvious intent of the Legislature was to address a serious societal problem, the threat of harm to others from the possession of objects that can be used as weapons under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for such lawful uses as those objects may have. Some objects that may be used as weapons also have more innocent purposes. For example, a machete can be a lethal weapon or a useful device for deep sea fishing. [ 96 N.J. at 161 ]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 221 N.J. Super. 66 - State v. Blaine