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← 47 CALAPP2D 1 - People v. Montgomery

People v. Montgomery’s Empirical Analysis

1941

Citation profile

132
cited by 132 later decisions
7
states following
June 2011
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 130 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 132 later decisions — most recently June 2011 · most notably 15 Cal. 3d 286 - Murgia v. Municipal Court (1975), 27 Cal. 2d 478 - People v. Adamson (1946)

2 federal appellate · 130 state decisions

41019411950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Yick Wo v. Hopkins · People v. Yeager · People v. O'Bryan · 21 Cal. App. 63 - People v. Lawlor · People v. Luis

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 132 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"`* * * While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of equality before the law, it does not follow that they are to be protected in the commission of crime. * * * The remedy for unequal enforcement of the law in such instances does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society. * * * Protection of the law will be extended to all persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person has the right to demand protection of the law in the commission of a crime. * * *'" 213 Or. at 639-40 , 325 P.2d at 804 .”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), any person who does any of the following is guilty of pandering, a felony, and shall be punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, or six years: “(1) Procures another person for the purpose of prostitution. “(2) By promises, threats, violence, or by any device or scheme, causes, induces, persuades, or encourages another person to become a prostitute. “(3) Procures for another person a place as an inmate in a house of prostitution or as an inmate of any place in which prostitution is encouraged or allowed within this state. “(4) By promises, threats, violence, or by any device or scheme, causes, induces, persuades, or encourages an inmate of a house of prostitution, or any other place in which prostitution is encouraged or allowed, to remain therein as an inmate. “(5) By fraud or artifice, or by duress of person or goods, or by abuse of any position of confidence or authority, procures another person for the purpose of prostitution, or to enter any place in which prostitution is encouraged or allowed within this state, or to come into this state or leave this state for the purpose of prostitution. “(6) Receives or gives, or agrees to receive or give, any money or thing of value for procuring, or attempting to procure, another person for the purpose of prostitution, or to come into this state or leave this state for the purpose of prostitution. “(b) Any person who does any of the acts described in subdivision (a) ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  3. ““Appellant also takes exception to the trial court’s instruction to the effect that under the provisions of the pandering statute, if the evidence discloses that defendant acceded to the importunities of a wanton woman and at her request found her a place in a house of prostitution, the defendant is just as guilty of the offense of pandering as though he had induced her to become such an inmate by means of threats, violence or fraud. In this regard, appellant in his contentions misconstrues the meaning and application of the term ‘procure’ as used in the statute, and in fact misconstrues the entire purpose of the statute. It is immaterial whether the female ‘procured’ is an innocent girl or a hardened prostitute of long experience; nor is it material that the procurement was either at her request or upon the defendant's own initiative. In either case the defendant has ‘procured’ a female within the meaning of the act and is guilty of pandering. The instruction to which appellant here excepts correctly construed the pandering statute. [Citation.] ””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.