¶1Circuit Courts — Suits i?r Receivers or National Banks — Jurisdiction.
¶2A receiver oí a national bank may sue in the circuit court to recover an indebtedness owing to tbe bank, without regard to the amount involved.
¶3Motibn to Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction of the Court.
¶4Assuinpdt to recover $150, the amount of an alleged discounted note, by Robert J. Yardley, receiver of the Keystone National Bank of Philadelphia, against. Janies Dickson.
¶5Aaron Thompson, for defendant, for exception—
¶6Cited as to the amount necessary to confer jurisdiction: Act Cong. Sept. 24, 1789, § 3; Act Cong. March 3, 1875, § 1, (18 St. at Large, 470, 473;) Act Cong. March 3, 1887, gg 2, 6, (24 St. at Large, 552;) Act Aug. 13,1888, § 1, (2-5 St. at Large, 483;)' U. S. v. Huffmaster, 35 Fed. Rep. 81. As to the fact that national banks and their officers are to be considered the same as individuals, and are to be governed by the same laws as respects jurisdiction: Act Cong. Aug. 13,1888, § 4, (25 St. at Large, 433.)
¶7John R. Read and Silas W. Pettit, for plaintiffs.
¶8Clause 3, § 629, Rev. St. H. S., provides that circuit courts of United States shall have original jurisdiction “of ail suits at common law where the United States, or any officer thereof, suing under the authority of any act of congress, are plaintiffs. ” Where there is such a plaintiff, jurisdiction attaches independent of the amount. U. S. v. Mooney, 116 U. S. 104, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 304. A receiver of a national bank is an officer of the United States “suing under the authority of an act of congress.” Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall. 498; Frelinghuysen v. Baldwin, 12 Fed. Rep. 395; Platt v. Beach, 2 Ben. 303; Stanton v. Wilkeson, 8 Ben. 357; Price v. Abbott, 17 Fed. Rep. 506. This jurisdiction was not affected by act of 1887. Armstrong v. Trautman, 36 Fed. Rep. 275; Armstrong v. Ettlesohn, Id. 209; McConville v. Gil *836mour, Id. 277; U. S. v. Shaw, 39 Fed. Rep. 433. Another ground of jurisdiction lies in the fact that prior to 1882 a national bank might sue in the district where the bank was situated, regardless of amount of claim. Mitchell v. Walker, 2 Browne; Nat. Bank. Cas. 180; Rev. St. § 629, clause 10. A receiver succeeds to bank’s rights, (Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall. 498;) and he could sue, after 1882, in district where bank is located, (Hendee v. Railroad Co., 26 Fed. Rep. 677.) The act of August 13, 1888, § 4, (25 St. at Large, 433,) provided that section should not refer to “suits for winding up national banks.”
¶10We have considered the question of jurisdiction in above case, and are satisfied that the court has jurisdiction.