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← 47 F.3d 385 - Million v. Frank

Million v. Frank’s Empirical Analysis

47 F.3d 385 · 1995

Citation profile

62
cited by 62 later decisions
August 2018
most recently cited

15 federal appellate · 28 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 62 later decisions — most recently August 2018 · most notably Graham-Humphreys v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, Inc. (2000), Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (2005)

15 federal appellate · 28 district ·

300199520002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 29 U.S.C. § 791 · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 701 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 706 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)

Relies on Landgraf v. USI Film Products · Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. · Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs · Bryson Properties, XVIII v. Travelers Insurance Co. · City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 62 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Equitable tolling may be appropriate where `the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the cause of action, or where the plaintiff has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his rights.'”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “is a condition precedent to suit that functions like a statute of limitations.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[A] newly enacted statute that lengthens the applicable statute of limitations may not be applied retroactively to revive a plaintiffs claim that was otherwise barred under the old statutory scheme because to do so would ‘alter the substantive rights’ of a party and ‘increase a party’s liability.’ In this case the rights of the defendant would be altered and its liability increased because it would be forced to defend an action that was previously time-barred.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.