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47 Ga. 133

Gardner v. Lamback

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided July 15, 1872

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 1872-07-15

<p>1. When on the trial of a caveat to a will, one of the grounds of the caveat was the insanity of the testator, at the time of the making of the will and another of the grounds was monomania, and that the will was the result of the monomania :</p> <p>Held, That when the Judge was requested by the caveators to charge the jury that “ the test of insanity was delusion — the belief in the existence of that which does not exist, as for instance, the belief of a man of large means that he has not the means to buy the common necessaries of life, and medicines prescribed by his physician,” and the Judge refused to charge in the language requested, but said, “that such de- 1 lusion was one of the evidences, but was not conclusive.” This was not error ; it was not proper for the Court to select out any particular instance of delusion, and charge the jury that it was a test of insanity.</p> <p>2. When the Judge was asked to charge the jury, “ that in order that a delusion should be such as to invalidiate a will, it is not necessary it should be a delusion as to the persons to be affected by the will; it is sufficient if the delusion be such as to affect the subject matter to be dis- . posed of by the will,” and the Judge refused to charge in the language requested, buff did charge, “ that if the testator was a monomaniac, it must appear that the will is not in any way the result of, or connected with that monomania, and that the will does speak the wishes of the testator at the date thereof, unbiased by the disease with which h^ is afflicted:”</p> <p>Held, That the language requested, to-wit: “ It is sufficient if the delusion be such as effected the subject matter to be disposed of” was such as was calculated to mislead the jury, and that the charge as given by the Judge was aproper direction as to the law upon the point requested.</p> <p>3. It was not improper for the Judge to refuse to charge as requested, that certain specified acts of the testator would, if proven, be strong evidence of insanity. It was for the jury, and not the Judge, to deter- • mine as to the weight of any particular proof.</p> <p>4. It was not error in the Court to charge the jury, “ that a testator may, by his will, make any disposition of his property that he chooses, not contrary to law, and that it is not contrary to law, nor to the pxxblic policy of the State for a testator to give more of his property to one child than to others.”</p> <p>5. It was not error in the Court to charge the jury that the words “ not of sound and disposing mind,” are legal terms and import a total deprivation of reason, such charge having been requested in writing by the executor, and the record showing that one of the grounds of the caveat was insanity generally, and it further appealing that the Court instructed the jury properly as to the law of partial insanity, to-wit: “ that if the testator was partially insane, and the will was in any way the effector result of that insanity it was void.”</p> <p>6. A new trial will not be gi-anted on the ground of newly discovered testimony, if said newly discovered testimony be cumulative only, and when there was a trial on an issue of insanity and of partial insanity, and much evidence and many circumstances of the testator’s acts, and . conversations bearing on the question were introduced as evidence:</p> <p>Held That new facts aad cii-cumstances bearing on the same point are only cumulative testimony, and do not authorize a new trial. ,</p> <p>7. The verdict of the jury in this case, is not contrary to.law, nor to any legal chax-ge of the Court, nor is it so contrary to the evidence, if it be so at all, as to justify this Court in overruling the judgment of the Court below in its order refusing a new trial.</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1872-07-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 16 later decisions — most recently April 1965

15 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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McCay, Judge.

¶11. In an inquiry like that disclosed in this record, sanity or insanity, it is dangerous to lay down any positive rules. There is not a man living who has not done acts which others pronounce insane; and, on the other hand, insanity sometimes eludes all ordinary inquiry. To say that delusion is *192the test of insanity, is itself contrary to some of the writers upon the subject, but to specify a particular delusion and declare that a test, would, we think, be an assumption by the Judge of the powers of the jury. As to the particular delusion mentioned in this request to charge, whilst, without doubt it is such an one as an insane person might well have, yet it is no uncommon thing for great lovers of money, as they grow old, to fall into it, and yet display in all their dealings a perfect comprehension of business affairs.

¶22. There is the same objection to the written request as to monomania. Whilst the principle covered by the words is , perhaps true, to-wit: “ that the delusion need not refer necessarily to the persons affected by the will,” yet it might mislead the jury to say to them that it is sufficient if it affect the property bequeathed.

¶3We think-that all the truth in the charge asked, was covered by the charge as given, to-wit: It must appear that the will is not in any way the result of the delusion, or connected with it. The real object of inquiry in cases of this character is not so much to classify the mental condition of the testator, as to discover if the will speaks his real, intelligent intentions.

¶4It seems to us that this is the great mistake of the plaintiff in error in this whole case. Modern writers upon the subject of insanity as a disease, include within their definition of the term many persons whom the law would punish as criminals if they violated the law, and whom the law would declare competent to make a will. The medical writers treat the subject as philosophers and as healers. The law inquires into it with the view of seeing how far society can afford to make insanity an excuse for crime, and at what point it is best for the general good, to say that a man shall not be allowed to make a will. The right to say who shall, after the death of the owner, have his property, is a right long held precious in the history of English law. A large majority of wills are made in the last hours of life, a time necessarily of pain, trial and disturbance. And it is a wise provision of the *193law that whilst it takes great precaution to prevent fraud and imposition, it does not withdraw the testamentary privilege until the reason itself be gone. It is a precious right, and one that should be guarded with jealous care, that the aged and infirm, the weak minded and eccentric shall have this security for care and attention on a sick bed. And it may be truly said, without any harsh criticism on human nature, that many a fired brain has been cooled by. gentle hands, and many a death bed cheered and watched over with kind care, which, but for this tender care of the law for this testamentary right, would have been neglected and deserted. Our Code, sections 2372, 2373, 2374, is in substance fairly given by the Judge in his charge to the jury. Nor is the law as laid down in the Code materially different from the rulings of this Court in Potts vs. House, 6 Georgia, 324. To make one incapable of making a will from insanity, he. must be “ non compos mentis,” there must be a “total deprivation of reason.” However old, feeble, weak minded, capricious, notionate he may be, if he “be able to have a decided and rational desire as to the disposition of his property,” he is not wanting in testamentary capacity. And in making the inquiry it would seem from the very words of the Code 'that attention is to be given, not so much to the state of the mind as an abstract philosophical or medical question, as to its capacity for the precise thing in hand. For a man may say and do things which a medical man would take as evidence of insanity, and yet it may be that he is nevertheless able to have a decided rational desire as to the disposition of his property.

¶53. Unquestionably this was an improper request. It is not for the Judge, but the jury to weigh the testimony. Whether any particular fact, if proven, is strong evidence of insanity or not, is strictly a question of the weight of evidence. And if evidence be competent, not immaterial, it must from the very nature of jury trials be for the jury, and not the Judge to say how much weight is to be given to it. We see no objection to this charge as to the right of a man to cut off any or all of his children if he see fit. It is true in fact that *194this is the law. And we see no harm in thus informing a jury that a testator is free to do as he pleases. The words used by the Judge as to the meaning of the words “sound and disposing mind,” are taken from the decisions of this Court in Potts vs. House, 6 Georgia, 324, and are nothing but the common language of the books upon the subject.

¶6True this charge was not applicable to the issue of monomania. But the caveat went not only on monomania but insanity generally. It was the duty of the 'Judge to charge on the issues made. Nor could this charge mislead the jury, ■for he distinctly charged also and in full, on the law of monomania. As to the newly discovered evidence, what is it but other facts of the sayings and doings of the testator, of which the record is full. Doubtless, more still can be found. The evidence is strictly cumulative. There is a great deal of the same kind of evidence in the brief,, and it is evidence exactly within the formal written issues that were tried. There is a limit to the indulgence the public gives to suitors. They have time given to prepare their cases. It is their duty to search all the probable depositories of the facts, and if they go to trial and lose, they cannot ask the country to give them a new hearing because they have found more facts of the same general tenor bearing upon the issue. The evidence discovered must be such as most probably would change the verdict. We cannot say that is so in this case. All these witnesses can prove may be so, and yet this verdict be right. We do not intend to go into an analysis of the evidence. We do not say the verdict is demanded by the evidence, but we do say that, in our judgment, a fair minded jury might come to this very conclusion, and not be open to the charge of prejudice, passion, corruption or mistake. We have no power to interfere with the judgment refusing a new trial, unless the verdict of the jury be illegal, and the judgment of the Judge exercising his legal discretion be also illegal.

¶7Judgment affirmed.

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