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← 47 MINN 171 - Graham v. Burch

Graham v. Burch’s Empirical Analysis

1891

Citation profile

26
cited by 26 later decisions
16
states following
January 1966
most recently cited

26 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 26 later decisions — most recently January 1966 · most notably Estate of Fay (1904), Parker v. Lewis (1915)

26 state decisions — followed in 16 states

10018911900191019201930194019501960decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Dan v. Brown · Greenwood v. Murray · Mitchell v. Mitchell · Heirs of Blanchard v. Heirs of Blanchard · Jackson ex dem. J. S. v. Betts

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Under the clause saving revocations, ‘Implied by law from subsequent changes in the condition or circumstances of the testator,’ it is.claimed that the conveyance to Mrs. Burch above referred to, and which was set aside by the court on the ground of undue influence, must be construed as an implied revocation of the will in question. Of course, a sale of the estate devised must operate as a revocation, for the will cannot thereafter take effect on it; and it is admitted that, if the deed had been valid and effectual to convey the premises, it would have worked a revocation; but the respondent insists that the rule is not applicable to a deed adjudged invalid, and not the deed of the grantor, for fraud or undue influence. If, in opposition to the allowance of a will in probate proceedings, a revocation in writing, executed in due form by the testator, had been produced, clearly the proponent would not be concluded from showing that it was not the voluntary act of the testator, but that it was procured by fraudulent devices and undue influence. O’Neall v. Farr, 1 Rich. (Law), 80. But we can see no distinction in this respect between such an instrument and a deed which is claimed to work a revocation by implication, if the deed was not the act of the testator, and the existence of the deed is due to fraud and undue influence, especially where, as in this instance, the fact is already adjudicated that the instrument, though in form the testator’s deed, is no deed. ‘Whoever orders”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “upon appeal from an order of the probate court allowing or refusing the probate of a will, the district court exercises probate jurisdiction to make such determination as the probate court ought to have made, — Berkey v. Judd, 31 Minn. 271 , ( 17 N.W. 618 ,) — but no other or greater. It can exercise no original jurisdiction in the premises, and cannot assume, on such appeal, to declare a trust under the will, or to determine the ultimate rights and interests of parties in the estate.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.