47 So. 2d 774 - Corren v. Corren’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 district · 21 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"Our opinion coincides with that of the Supreme Court of the United States expressed in Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 , 31 S.Ct. 111, 112 , 54 L.Ed. 1180 , 30 L.R.A.,N.S., 1153, 21 Ann.Cas. 921, that any change in the law so far-reaching and radical as to obliterate the common law unity `should only be wrought [by the legislature] by language so clear and plain as to be unmistakable evidence of the legislative intention.' In that decision the court commented upon the effect upon public welfare and domestic harmony if each spouse were given the right to sue the other as if they were not married and then further observed: `Had it been the legislative purpose not only to permit the wife to bring suits free from her husband's participation and control, but to bring actions against him also for injuries to person or property as though they were strangers, thus emphasizing and publishing differences which otherwise might not be serious, it would have been easy to have expressed that intent in terms of irresistible clearness.' * * * * * * "The legislature will assume grave responsibility when it enacts that each spouse may treat the other as a stranger so far as legal rights are concerned; and when it does so, the language proclaiming this revolutionary change should be positive and unambiguous. "We are impelled to the conclusion that the circuit judge was eminently correct when he held that the appellant could not and should not prevail in this case."”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Amendola v. Amendola · 379 So. 2d 352 - Raisen v. Raisen

2. “[T]he so-called emancipation act did not so affect the marriage relationship that the husband and wife were thenceforward permitted to go their separate ways, but instead were still mates residing in a common home, each making in his own way a contribution to the marriage venture. As we have already commented, this fundamental relationship does not seem directly affected by the provisions of organic and statutory law with reference to the woman's dominion over her own property, and we feel that we would have to resort to the illogic to hold that there can be found in any of them the implication even that she might sue her spouse for injuries resulting from the negligent operation of his automobile.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 379 So. 2d 352 - Raisen v. Raisen · 593 So. 2d 222 - Waite v. Waite

3. “"The appellant regards Chapter 21932, supra, as having destroyed the `unity of the marriage association' as it theretofore existed and reasons that if the wife may enter into agreements, as is provided in Section 2 of the act, and may `sue and be sued,' as is provided in Section 1, it follows that she, being empowered to sue her husband in case of a breach of their agreement, may also sue him for a tort committed upon her. But we cannot follow the appellant to this conclusion. `Under the common law', we said in Taylor v. Dorsey, 155 Fla. 305 , 19 So.2d 876, 880 , `the woman and the man became one person upon marriage, and that person was the husband. * * * This unity, or more accurately, merger, has been called the foundation for the rights, duties, and disabilities of marriage.' "We have not found in our examination of the legislative enactment any plain provision extending a married woman's rights to include a suit against her husband for tort. It seems to us that the trend toward giving a married woman more freedom has largely been with regard to her separate property and her dealings with persons other than her husband."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 200 So. 2d 171 - Bencomo v. Bencomo