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47 Wash. App. 760

737 P.2d 687

Trowbridge v. Walsh

Court of Appeals of Washington

Decided May 21, 1987

Court of Appeals of Washington · decided 1987-05-21

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently October 2009

4 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“The arbitration hearing may proceed, and an award may be made, in the absence of any party who after due notice fails to participate or to obtain a continuance. If a defendant is absent, the arbitrator shall require the plaintiff to submit the evidence required for the making of an award. In a case involving more than one defendant, the absence of a defendant does not preclude the arbitrator from assessing as part of the award damages against the defendant or defendants who are absent. The arbitrator, for good cause shown, may allow an absent party an opportunity to appear at a subsequent hearing before making an award. A party who fails to participate without good cause waives the right to a trial de novo.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Trowbridge v. Walsh

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1987-05-21

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Munson, J.

¶1 Gary and Donna Trowbridge moved to dismiss this appeal alleging the notice of appeal was untimely. The appeal was from a judgment entered upon an arbitration award after an arbitration proceeding. We find the notice of appeal was timely and deny the motion to dismiss.

¶2 The Walshes, being displeased with an arbitrator's decision, sought a trial de novo in the superior court pursuant to Mandatory Arbitration Rule 7.1. The Trowbridges moved to dismiss the request, alleging noncompliance with MAR 5.4, i.e., "A party who fails to participate without good cause waives the right to a trial de novo." Ultimately, the superior court granted the Trowbridges' motion to dismiss and entered its order confirming that decision. Several months later, the Trowbridges entered judgment on the award. The Walshes appeal. The Trowbridges move to dismiss the appeal.

¶3 The Trowbridges contend the appeal is untimely inasmuch as the Walshes should have appealed from the superior court order denying a trial de novo, not the judgment. They contend RAP 2.2(a)(3) applies because the order denying the trial de novo was a "written decision affecting a substantial right in a civil case which in effect determines *762 the action and prevents a final judgment or discontinues the action."

¶4 The Walshes had a choice: they could have appealed from the order denying the trial de novo or from the final judgment. RAP 2.2(a) sets forth 13 superior court decisions from which an appeal may be taken. There is no prioritizing of those decisions other than they must of necessity be listed in some order. Here, there was an order which effectively discontinued the action, but there was also a final judgment.

¶5 The notice of appeal was timely. The motion is denied.

Thompson, A.C.J., and Green, J., concur.
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