¶1*152Larry W. Pitts, Newton, N. C. (Stanley J. Come, Come, Warlick & Pitts, Newton, N. C., on brief), for appellant.
¶2David B. Sentelle, Asst. U. S. Atty. (Keith S. Snyder, U. S. Atty. for Western District of North Carolina, on brief), for appellee.
¶3Before WINTER, BUTZNER, and RUSSELL, Circuit Judges.
¶5Pearlie Donald Workman appeals from his conviction of possessing sugar intended for use in making liquor in violation of the Internal Revenue Code. Workman claims that the pretrial photographic identification procedure which led to his in-court identification was unnecessarily suggestive and deprived him of due process of law. We vacate the judgment of the district court and remand the case for a new trial.
¶6A federal agent investigating bootlegging attempted to halt a pickup truck that he had observed departing from Workman’s residence. Instead of stopping for the agent, the driver, whom the agent could not identify, drove across an open field to woods where he abandoned the vehicle and escaped. The agent found that the truck contained a large quantity of sugar, which, through markings on one of the packages, he traced to a grocery store in Shelby, North Carolina. To learn the identity of the purchaser, the agent showed a photograph of Workman to the manager of the store. The manager said that the purchaser appeared to be older than the man in the picture, but he noted a resemblance. He volunteered that the same person had purchased large amounts of sugar on two other occasions. Workman was subsequently arrested and photographed. The agent then showed the new picture to the manager, who said that it looked like the person who had purchased the sugar. Just before trial, the agent again showed the photograph to the witness.
¶7Over the objection of Workman’s counsel, the manager testified that Workman was involved in the purchase of large quantities of sugar on three oc*153casions. He admitted, however, that his in-court identification depended on the photographs.1
¶8In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), the Court, though recognizing that initial identification by photograph may result in convictions based on misidentifieation, nevertheless refused to prohibit the practice because of its utility in apprehending offenders and protecting innocent suspects. Instead, it ruled “that convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentifieation.” 390 U.S. at 384, 88 S.Ct. at 971. After discussing the hazards of photographic identification, Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, specifically cautioned that the danger of misidentifieation “will be increased if the police display to the witness only the picture of a single individual who generally resembles the person he saw . . . .” 390 U.S. at 383, 88 S.Ct. at 971. We applied the sanction that Simmons directs in Kimbrough v. Cox, 444 F.2d 8 (4th Cir. 1971), where the only evidence of guilt consisted of eyewitness identification by persons who had been shown only a photograph of the defendant.
¶9 Here, as in Kimbrough, it was improper for the investigating officer to display only photographs of a single suspect to an eyewitness. Preparation of a photographic spread containing pictures of different people is a minor burden for an investigator when measured against the potential prejudice to the accused. Moreover, the likelihood of in-court misidentifieation was increased by the officer’s subsequent use of Workman’s photograph to refresh the memory of the witness the morning of the trial, a practice condemned in Kimbrough, 444 F.2d at 10.
¶10We hold that the procedure used to obtain the manager’s pretrial photographic identification was so impermissibly suggestive that the probability of misidentifieation was substantial. The government did not introduce this evidence when it presented its case in chief, and the facts concerning the pretrial photographic identification were disclosed on voir dire. Ordinarily, therefore, we would remand for a hearing to determine whether clear and convincing evidence established that the in-court identification was not based on the pretrial identification. Cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). However, this step is unnecessary because, as we have noted, the manager’s voir dire testimony established that his in-court identification was based on the improper pretrial photographic identification. Since his in-court identification did not have an independent origin, it was inadmissible.
¶11Apart from the manager’s identification, the government introduced only scant circumstantial evidence linking Workman to the crime. It is apparent, therefore, that the manager’s in-court identification was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Admission of this evidence was prejudicial er*154ror which deprived Workman of due process. The only remedy adequate to rectify this error is to vacate Workman’s conviction and remand the case for a new trial at which testimony of the store manager’s visual2 identification of Workman will not be admitted.
¶12Vacated and remanded.