Lyell v. Renico’s Empirical Analysis
470 F.3d 1177 · 2006
Citation profile
13 federal appellate · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 27 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 2020 · most notably Johnson v. Williams (2013), Johnson v. Williams (2013)
13 federal appellate · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 455
Relies on Williams v. Taylor · Estelle v. McGuire · Liteky et al United States · In the Matters of Lee Roy Murchison and John Whites · Quercia v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“First, judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.... Second, opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge^ although] they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible____Not establishing bias or partiality, however, are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women ... sometimes display.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Brasfield and all of the other cases upon which Lyell relies stem from judicial inquiries into the numerical division of a deadlocked jury. Yet there is a world of difference between juror-coercion claims arising from deadlocked juries and those arising from post-verdict juror polling. In the former situation, there is never any reason to expose the numerical division of the jurors. The trial court may decide to give a seemingly deadlocked jury an Allen charge to urge it to continue its deliberations in good faith, but the court has no reason to ask, or find out, which jurors stand where on the charges. The same is not true with juror polling. There, it is not only necessary but desired (at least from the defendant’s perspective) for the public to learn that at least one juror has opted to take a stand against conviction.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“[Tjhere seemed to be little point to continuing to poll the last two jurors (save with defense counsel’s consent) because one holdout suffices to send the jury back to deliberate. But there is nothing about the judge’s actions that suggests that this was anything more than a slip in inertia after polling the first 12 jurors. Nor, it bears adding, did defense counsel do anything to stop the judge, which itself suggests a non-eoercive environment.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.