Commonwealth v. Walker’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

39 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"[t]he duty of this Court on appeal is to consider only the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses, and so much of the evidence for the defense as fairly read in the context of the record as a whole remains uncontradicted, and based upon this review, to determine whether the record supports the factual findings of the suppression court and the legitimacy of the inferences and the legal conclusions drawn from those findings." (citations omitted).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 259 Pa. Super. 407 - Com. v. Washington · 259 Pa. Super. 407 - Commonwealth v. Washington

2. “In [Commonwealth v.] Bullard [ 465 Pa. 341 , 350 A.2d 797 (1976) ] appellant’s desire not to answer police questions was conveyed to the police through certain intermediaries. In the instant case appellant stated his desires directly to the interrogating officer involved, and the fact that he did not have the wherewithal to surrender himself to police in the presence of a judge, or did not have the presence of mind to request the assistance of an attorney at the same time he conveyed his desire not to speak, in no way derogates from his expression of a desire to exercise his constitutional right to remain silent. As stated by the Miranda court, “[i]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. (Footnote omitted.) At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.” (Emphasis added.) 384 U.S. 436, 473-474 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627-1628 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 723 (1966).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 316 Pa. Super. 462 - Commonwealth v. Caswell

3. ““The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in Anglo-American courts for 200 years: the test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been overborne, and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 , 81 S.Ct. 735 , 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961). The line of distinction is that at which governing self-direction is lost and compulsion, of whatever nature or however infused, propels or helps to propel the confession.” Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, at 602 , 81 S.Ct. 1860, at 1879 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037, at 1057 (1961). See also, Commonwealth v. Walker, 470 Pa. 534 , 368 A.2d 1284 (1977).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 263 Pa. Super. 504 - Commonwealth v. Hunt