470 So. 2d 80 - Rita v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1985
Citation profile
14 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 14 later decisions — most recently April 2010
14 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Gideon v. Wainwright · Knight v. State · 396 So. 2d 1107 - Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Com'n · Brown v. State · 288 So. 2d 490 - Bernhardt v. State
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[Rule 3.850] has the same scope as the common law writ of habeas corpus. Gideon v. Wainwright, 153 So.2d 299, 300 (Fla. 1963). The meaning of "custody" as used in rule 3.850 is the same as that applied to determine the right or standing of a person to petition for a writ of habeas corpus. State v. Barber, 301 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1974). It has long been recognized that a person serving probation is sufficiently restrained in his liberty to have standing to seek review of the validity of his conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding. Ex Parte Bosso, 41 So.2d 322 (Fla. 1949). In this instance Rita was being restrained in jail pursuant to the order of probation and awaiting a hearing on revocation. Surely he was then being restrained in custody just as much as if he were serving the thirty days in jail imposed as a condition of probation under the so-called split sentence authorized by sections 948.01.03, Florida Statutes. The appellate courts of this state have been routinely reviewing the denial of rule 3.850 motions filed by persons in custody under a split sentence imposing imprisonment and probation. [Citations omitted.] Discerning no substantial reason for distinguishing between being a prisoner in custody while awaiting a revocation hearing and a prisoner in custody to fulfill a condition of probation, we conclude that Rita had standing to make his 3.850 motion in this instance.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“[i]f the premises where contraband is found is in joint, rather than exclusive, possession ..., knowledge of the contraband's presence and the ability to control it will not be inferred from the ownership but must be established by independent proof.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“The law governing criminal liability for constructive possession is relevant in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant revocation of probation based on a criminal act.”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Corker v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.