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471 So. 2d 146

471 So.2d 146

10 Fla.L.Weekly 1406

Wheeler v. Barron

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided June 7, 1985

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1985-06-07

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently May 2018

2 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“(g) Effect of Mistrial; Appeal; Order of New Trial. A person who is to be tried again or whose trial has been delayed by an appeal by the State or the defendant shall be brought to trial within 90 days from the date of declaration of a mistrial by the trial court granting a new trial, the date of an order by the trial court granting a motion in arrest of judgment, or the date of receipt by the trial court of a mandate, order, or notice of whatever form from an appellate or other reviewing court which makes possible a new trial for the defendant, whichever is last in time. If a defendant is not brought to trial within the prescribed time periods, the defendant shall be entitled to the appropriate remedy as set forth in section (i) below.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 491 So. 2d 1245 - Hochstrasser v. Demers

Relies on State v. Jenkins · 468 So. 2d 978 - State v. Wheeler · 414 So. 2d 505 - Nelson v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1985-06-07

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION

PER CURIAM.

¶2Petitioner, who is scheduled for retrial on several felony convictions, seeks a writ of prohibition on the ground that the speedy trial period has expired.

¶3After this court reversed petitioner’s convictions, and remanded for new trial,1 the state sought review in the supreme court. The state also moved the trial court for an extension of the speedy trial period until disposition of the supreme court proceed*147ings. The motion was granted by an order stating that

... the Speedy Trial timeJn the above-styled cause is extended until such time as the Supreme Court of Florida denies certiorari jurisdiction or until said Court issues its decision in this case.

¶4The supreme court decision affirming our reversal was issued on April 25, 1985,2 and petitioner maintains that the extension of the speedy trial time expired on that date.

¶5Petitioner relies on State v. Jenkins, 389 So.2d 971 (Fla.1980), and Nelson v. State, 414 So.2d 505 (Fla.1982). Neither of these cases is controlling. Both were decided under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191 as it existed pri- or to the January 1, 1981, amendments. Jenkinsinvolved a delay in the initial trial due to an interlocutory appeal by the state. At that time, Rule 3.191(g) did not provide a 90-day speedy trial extension after disposition of an interlocutory appeal. Therefore, the court held it was necessary for the state to secure further extensions when its appeal resulted in a delay beyond the extension date initially granted by the trial court. In Nelson, the court merely affirmed the trial court’s authority to extend the speedy trial time when the state seeks supreme court review of a district court decision.

¶6We hold that where, as here, the speedy trial period is extended for a period covering the pendency of review by the supreme court, the 90-day extension in the current Rule 3.191(g) becomes effective upon disposition of the cause by that court. Therefore, the state is permitted 90 days from the date of receipt by the trial court of the supreme court’s mandate in which to bring petitioner to trial.

¶7Petition for writ of prohibition denied.

BOOTH, SMITH and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.

¶8. Wheeler v. State, 425 So.2d 109 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

¶9. State v. Wheeler, 468 So.2d 978 (Fla. 1985).

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