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← 472 NW2D 100 - Rico v. State

Rico v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1991

Citation profile

105
cited by 105 later decisions
1
states following
September 2016
most recently cited

15 federal appellate · 24 district · 64 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 105 later decisions — most recently September 2016 · most notably Brown v. City of Golden Valley (2009), Greiner v. City of Champlin (1994)

15 federal appellate · 24 district · 64 state decisions

590199120002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Harlow v. Fitzgerald · Anderson v. Creighton · Mitchell v. Forsyth · Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205 Will County Illinois · Connick v. Myers

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 105 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Malice means nothing more than the intentional doing of wrongful act without legal justification or excuse, or, otherwise stated, the willful violation of a known right.”
    9 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “[t]he defendant must have reason to know that the challenged conduct is prohibited. The exception does not impose liability merely because an official intentionally commits an act that a court or a jury subsequently determines is a wrong. Instead, the exception anticipates liability only when an official intentionally commits an act that he or she then has reason to believe is prohibited.”
    7 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “[Ojfficial immunity primarily is “intended to insure that the threat of potential liability does not unduly inhibit the exercise of discretion required of public officers in the discharge of their duties.” Holmquist v. State, 425 N.W.2d 230 , 233 n. 1 (Minn. 1988). * * * * In defining the scope of official immunity, we have distinguished between the performance of discretionary duties— which is immunized, and ministerial duties — for which officers remain liable. The court has described an official’s duty as ministerial “when it is absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.” Cook v. Trovatten, 200 Minn. 221, 224 , 274 N.W. 165, 167 (1937).”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.