IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
WALTER HAN LAAK, No. 77449
Appellant,
vs. FILED
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent. SEP 30 2o2O
ELnEr f A. BPr:WN
CL .COURT
')F FRE6E,:
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE BY
DEPJÌY CLERK
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a
jury verdict, of one count of throwing a deadly missile; two counts of assault
with a deadly weapon; two counts of aggravated stalking; one count of
failure to stop required on signal of police officer; one count of battery with
use of a deadly weapon; one count of attempted murder with use of a deadly
weapon; three counts of discharging firearm at or into occupied structure,
vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft; and one count of discharge of firearm from
vehicle. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Jennifer P. Togliatti
and Tierra Danielle Jones, Judges.
Appellant Walter Laak argues that (1) the district court abused
its discretion by admitting expert testimony, (2) insufficient evidence
supported the verdict, and (3) cumulative error warrants reversal. We
disagree and affirm the judgment of conviction.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the expert
testimony
Laak argues that the State's expert witness, Dr. Coard,
wrongfully . . . opined as to the ultimate issues." First, he arg-ues that Dr.
Coard's testimony that Laak was not delusional "certainly suggests that
[Laak] was guilty," and so "insinuate& his guilt. Second, he argues that
Dr. Coard "testified that he did not believe [Laak] was reasonably justified,"
which is a legal conclusion.
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We review admission of expert testimony for abuse of
discretion. Mathews v. State, 134 Nev. 512, 514,
424 P.3d 634, 637 (2018).
A criminal defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity must
"establish by a preponderance of the evidence thae he or she did not "[k]now
or understand the nature and capacity of his or her act; or. . . [a]ppreciate
that his or her conduct was wrong due to a "delusional state" caused by "a
disease or defect of the mind." NRS 174.035(6). "[A] qualified expert
witness may testify regarding whether the defendant meets the elements of
the not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity plea under NRS 174.035(6)." Pundyk
v. State, 136 Nev., Adv. Op. 43,
467 P.3d 605, 608 (2020).
The first statement that Laak argues was an impermissible
conclusion was about Laak denying during a police interview that he hit his
mother's neighbor with his car, and claiming instead that the neighbor was
lying. Essentially, Dr. Coard testified that a delusional person would not
recognize the wrongfulness of deliberately striking someone with a car, and
so would not bother to deny doing so or claim that the victim was lying.
Laak objected to this insofar as he objected during an earlier sidebar to Dr.
Coard's use of the word "responsibility." The district court simply
instructed the State to clarify that the word, as Dr. Coard used it, was not
synonymous with guilt.
While Laak is correct that Dr. Coard's answer suggested and
insinuated that Look was guilty, it was not "a direct opinion on the ultimate
conclusion that a defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity or the
converse." Pundyk, 136 Nev., Adv. Op. 43,
467 P.3d at 608. It was simply
an opinion that Laak's answers were inconsistent with his purported
insanity, so the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting it.
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The second statement that Laak argues was an impermissible
conclusion was Dr. Coard's testimony that "[he did] not believe that [Laak]
was reasonably justified in taking these actions." Laak acknowledges but
otherwise seems to disregard Dr. Coard's immediate clarification that he
did not believe Laak was subjectively justified "[i]n his mind." Laak had
objected to the States preceding question—[U]nder his delusion would he
have been justifiedr —as calling for a legal conclusion. The district court
sustained his objection after a sidebar in which it explained that the State
would need to rephrase the question in order to ask whether Laak
subjectively believed himself to be justified "[i]n his mind," instead of
whether he was objectively justified under the law. The State did so, and
Dr. Coard answered accordingly.
Laak may have been correct had Dr. Coard answered the State's
initial question, which could have elicited an impermissible conclusion. But
Laak successfully objected to that question and the State rephrased it in
order to elicit an opinion about his mental state. And that is what Dr. Coard
gave, opining that in Laak's mind, he was not justified. The district court
did not abuse its discretion by admitting that testimony.'
1 Laak also argues that the district court abused its discretion by
giving Instructions 14 and 30. We decline to consider the first argument
because Laak does not argue cogently or cite supporting authority. Maresca
v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673,
748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987). And we decline to consider
the second argument because Laak did not object on the same grounds at
trial, Green v. State,
119 Nev. 542, 545,
80 P.3d 93, 94 (2003) (holding that
appellant waived a jury-instruction argument by "failling] to object . . . on
the ground he now asserts as error," despite objecting on another ground
and persuading the district court to modify the instruction), and as our
review of the trial transcript reveals, he invited any potential errors by
instead requesting the things to which he now objects, Carter v. State, 121
3
Sufficient evidence supported the verdict
Laak argues that insufficient evidence supported the dischargeof-firearm-from-vehicle verdict. He argues that the State presented no
evidence that he fired the shots while inside his car, but that the evidence
instead showed that "he stepped out of his car" and that he "testified that
he had not" fired from inside the car.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence
supporting a criminal conviction, this court considers "whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt." McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56,
825 P.2d 571,
573 (1992) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307,
319 (1979)).
Laak cites nothing supporting his claims that "he stepped out of
his car" or "testified that he had not" fired from inside the car.2 In his
relevant testimony, Laak instead described in immediate succession (1)
driving to the apartment where he fired the shots, (2) stepping on the
brakes, (3) taking aim, (4) firing, and (5) leaving. After viewing that
testimony in the light most favorable to the prosecution, McNair, 108 Nev.
at 56,
825 P.2d at 573, a rational trier of fact could have found that Laak
did not exit his car but instead fired from inside it, so we conclude that
sufficient evidence supported the verdict.
Nev. 759, 769,
121 P.3d 592, 599 (2005) (A party who participates in an
alleged error is estopped from raising any objection on appeal.").
2We remind Laak's counsel that every factual assertion requires a
supporting citation, NRAP 28(e)(1), and that we may issue fees or sanctions
for briefs not "presented with accuracy," NRAP 28(j).
4
And finally, in light of our disposition, there is no error to
cumulate.3 Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
arraguirre
J.
Hardesty cAL.t;
J.
cc: Hon. Jennifer P. Togliatti, District Judge
Hon. Tierra Danielle Jones, District Judge
James J. Ruggeroli
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
3Laak also argues that the district court committed several other
errors in his cumulative error argument. Because he did not object to those
alleged errors at trial and does not argue cogently or cite supporting
authority, we decline to consider them. See Rimer v. State, 131 Nev. 307,
328 n.3, 351 P.3d 697, 713 n.3 (2015) (explaining that this court need not
consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal); Maresca, 103 Nev.
at 673,
748 P.2d at 6.
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