Commonwealth v. Rodgers’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

151 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 151 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “... [I]t is not necessary that a real danger of prosecution exists to justify the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination. It is sufficient if the person questioned has reasonable cause to apprehend such danger. Moreover, the privilege extends not only to the disclosure of facts which would in themselves establish guilt, but also to any fact which might constitute an essential link in a chain of evidence by which guilt can be established. When an individual ... is called to testify ... in a judicial proceeding, he or she is not exonerated from answering questions merely upon a declaration that in so doing it would be self incriminating. It is also for the court to judge if the silence is justified, and an illusory claim should be rejected. However, for the court to properly overrule the claim of privilege, it must be perfectly dear from a careful consideration of all the circumstances, that the witness is mistaken in the apprehension of self-incrimination and the answers demanded cannot possibly have such a tendency. (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis in original.)”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Strickler · 367 Pa. Super. 394 - Commonwealth v. McGrogan

2. ““After conviction, direct appeal and collateral remedies available to an individual may result in a new trial. It is apparent, then, that the conviction does not eliminate the possibility that an individual will later be prosecuted for the crime about which he is asked to testify. Accordingly, the weight of authority permits a witness whose conviction has not been finalized on direct appeal to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to testify about the subject matter which formed the basis of his conviction. [Citations omitted] ... Appellant argues that a witness whose conviction is final but is seeking collateral relief cannot invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. We conclude that the privilege is not adequately protected by such a mechanistic rule.” See also Commonwealth v. Davenport, 453 Pa. 235 , 239-40 n.4, 308 A.2d 85 , 87 n.4 (1973); Commonwealth v. Garland, 475 Pa. 389 , 380 A.2d 777 (1977).”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 299 Pa. Super. 439 - Commonwealth v. Pavlocak · 2013 Pa. Super. 288 - Commonwealth v. Melvin

3. ““[T]hat the determination whether a witness . . . may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination is properly left to the sound discretion of the trial court. The trial court must consider all the circumstances and decide whether the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger or self-incrimination. “Our holding today is simply an application of the established procedure for judicial administration of witnesses’ claims of privilege . . . Given the fundamental values inhering in the privilege against self-incrimination . . . and the liberal treatment accorded such claims of privilege, a trial court’s ruling sustaining a witness’ claim will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at 457, 781 .”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Verdugo · Commonwealth v. Strickler