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472 So. 2d 737

472 So.2d 737

10 Fla.L.Weekly 356

Docket No. 66029.

JSH v. State

J.S.H., a Child, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Florida

Decided July 3, 1985.

Supreme Court of Florida · decided 1985-07-03

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“bear a significant relationship to the convicted offense.”

quoted by 8 later decisions, including DM v. State, 717 So. 2d 175 - JS v. State

“[i]n our view, the words `caused by his offense' ... do not mean that the offense charged must bear `a direct relationship' to the damages caused.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 480 So. 2d 163 - Jones v. State

Relies on WN v. State · 455 So. 2d 1143 - JSH v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1985-07-03

How this case has been cited

Cited by 50 later decisions — most recently November 2003 · most notably 520 So. 2d 276 - State v. Williams (1988), 588 So. 2d 636 - Mansingh v. State (1991)

50 state decisions

270198519902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Jerry Hill, Public Defender and Douglas S. Connor, Asst. Public Defender, Tampa, for petitioner.

¶2Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Charles Corces, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for respondent.

¶3ALDERMAN, Justice.

¶4We review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, in J.S.H. v. State, 455 So.2d 1143 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), which the district court certified to be in direct conflict with W.N. v. State, 426 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). The district court held that this juvenile's offense bore a sufficiently significant relationship to the victim's damages to support the trial court's order that the juvenile pay restitution to the victim under section 39.11(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1983). We agree and approve the decision of the district court.

¶5The victim anchored his twenty-one-foot motorboat to a bridge because it was running low on gas and a storm was approaching. Upon returning the next day, he found a person inside the boat cutting wires and loosening screws, and there was a large hole in the boat's bottom. A repair shop estimated that it would cost $1,500 to fully restore the boat. Several items of property (i.e., cooler, fire extinguisher, compass, toolbox) had also been stolen from the boat; however, with the exception of an ammeter worth $50, all of the property was eventually recovered.

¶6The state filed a petition for delinquency, charging petitioner with second-degree grand theft under section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1983). The trial court withheld *738 adjudication and placed him in a community control program. Subsequently, the trial court held a hearing on the issue of restitution under section 39.11(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1983). The court determined the victim's total damages to be $1,500 for repairing the boat and $50 for replacing the ammeter. Petitioner was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of one-half of $1,550.

¶7On appeal, petitioner argued that restitution was proper only for the ammeter but not for damages to the boat itself because he had been charged only with the crime of grand theft and not with the crime of criminal mischief. Petitioner asserted that the damage to the victim's boat was not "caused by his offense" as section 39.11(1)(g) requires. The district court disagreed, finding that the words "caused by his offense" do not mean that the offense charged must bear a direct relationship to the damages caused but rather that the damages bear a significant relationship to the crime charged. The court, however, certified direct conflict with W.N. v. State. In W.N., juveniles trespassed on school property and allegedly broke several thousand dollars worth of windows. They were originally charged with both criminal mischief and trespass. The criminal mischief charges were, however, nolle prossed. The court, nonetheless, ordered restitution to be paid for the broken windows. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed the restitution order and stated there was no relationship between the offense charged (trespass) and the damages. The court reasoned that only the criminal mischief charge had a direct relationship to the damages, and, because it was nolle prossed, there was no legal foundation to impose restitution.

¶8Petitioner contends, as he did in the district court, that the damages to the boat were not caused by his offense of grand theft. We disagree.

¶9The damages were the result of the theft as they resulted directly from petitioner's actions which were necessary to perpetrate his crime. The hole in the boat's bottom resulted from a seat being removed from the boat, and all the wires were cut in order to facilitate the theft of engine parts. These actions were undertaken so that items could be stolen and were necessary for the theft to occur. Without these acts of destruction, some items simply could not have been stolen. It is not necessary that the offense charged describe the damage done in order to support a restitution order but only that the damage bear a significant relationship to the convicted offense.

¶10Accordingly, we approve the decision of the district court.

¶11It is so ordered.

¶12BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, McDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.

¶13SHAW, J., concurs in result only.

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