472 So. 2d 79 - State v. Bruce’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “La.Const. Art. V, §§ 5 and 10 (1974) limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Louisiana and of the courts of appeal in criminal eases to questions of law. Whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction is a question of law, although the determination of this question necessarily involves a review of the record evidence. The standard for performing this review, mandated in Jackson v. Virginia, [ 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ] is that the reviewing court must determine that the record evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is sufficient to convince a rational juror that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of which he has been convicted. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a defendant in a criminal case against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the crime with which he is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The Jackson decision imposed the “rational juror” standard for reviewing the jury’s determination that the evidence constituted proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The standard for appellate review mandated by the United States Supreme Court also applies in cases which involve circumstantial evidence. The United States Supreme Court has rejected a contention that the trial judge is constitutionally required to instruct the jury that circumstantial evidence must exclude every reason”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Hernandez

2. “The State's evidence did establish that the defendant was in possession of the vehicle in question, and it also established its value was in excess of $500. However, the evidence did not establish that the vehicle was the subject of a robbery or a theft nor, under the circumstances, indicate the offender knew or had good reason to believe that the vehicle was the subject of a robbery or theft. Detective Alan Drumm of the Kenner Police Department testified that the car was listed by the Kenner Police as being stolen. He does not say on what the listing as stolen is premised, say just who reported the car stolen, nor lay a foundation as to the reliability of the listing. A Mr. Herbert Washington, employed by Avis Used Cars and relying on business records, testified that the car was owned by Avis on November 11, 1983; that Avis sold the car on January 18, 1984; and that Avis had paid $8421.27 for the car in March, 1983. Although on direct-examination he asserts the car was reported stolen and that the defendant never had permission to have the car, Mr. Washington on cross-exam concedes that he would not know if the defendant had permission to drive the car. Washington, moreover, responds with circular non-reasoning when defense counsel repeats the question. Additionally, he cannot say when last he saw the particular car since Avis had several blue Firebirds at that time. Mr. Washington never rents cars himself but does various odd jobs. Not Washington but the supervisor on duty ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 885 So. 2d 641 - State v. Lewis