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← 473 F.2d 599 - Rodriguez v. Jones

Rodriguez v. Jones’s Empirical Analysis

473 F.2d 599 · 1973

Citation profile

94
cited by 94 later decisions
6
states following
January 2002
most recently cited

67 federal appellate · 3 district · 7 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 94 later decisions — most recently January 2002 · most notably United States v. James (1976), Glasson v. City of Louisville (1975)

67 federal appellate · 3 district · 7 state decisions

5801973198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 3109 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on United States v. United States Gypsum Co. · Aguilar v. Texas · Spinelli v. United States · Monroe v. Pape · Adams v. Williams

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 94 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “credibility choices and the resolution of conflicting testimony are within the province of the court sitting without a jury, subject only to the clearly erroneous rule of Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a).”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Breaking doors and windows for entry and exit — The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he - is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Ordinarily when a suit of this type is brought a court will already have determined that there was no probable cause for the arrest and search complained of. Nevertheless the agent has a complete defense if he can convince the trier of the fact that he acted in good faith and that it was reasonable for him to have believed that the arrest and search were lawful. Thus there are two standards to be considered. The first is what constitutes reasonableness for purposes of defining probable cause under the fourth amendment for the protection of citizens against governmental overreaching. The other standard is the less stringent reasonable man standard of the tort action against governmental agents. This second and lesser standard is appropriate because, in many cases, federal officers cannot be expected to predict what federal judges frequently have considerable difficulty in deciding and about which they frequently differ among themselves. It would be contrary to the public interest if federal officers were held to a probable cause standard as in many cases they would fail to act for fear of guessing wrong. Consequently the law ought to, and does, protect governmental agents if they act in good faith and with a reasonable belief in the validity of the arrest and search.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.