473 So. 2d 984 - Cofer v. Ensor’s Empirical Analysis
1985
Citation profile
1 federal appellate · 17 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 22 later decisions — most recently March 2016
1 federal appellate · 17 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. · Parker v. Fies & Sons · White v. Ward · Nicholson v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc. · Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Co. v. Goodykoontz
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"In one [a statute of creation], the limitation [period] is so inextricably bound up in the statute creating the right that it is deemed a portion of the substantive right itself. In the other [a statute of limitation], the limitation is deemed to affect only the remedy and does not constitute part of the substantive right."”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“"`This Court has recognized . . . that a distinction exists between a true statute of limitations and a statute which creates a new right of action with an express restriction on the time within which an action may be brought to enforce the right.' Cofer v. Ensor, 473 So.2d 984, 987 (Ala.1985). The former is known as a statute of limitations, while the latter has been referred to by this Court as a `statute of creation.' Id. "`In one [a statute of creation], the limitation [period] is so inextricably bound up in the statute creating the right that it is deemed a portion of the substantive right itself. In the other [a statute of limitation], the limitation is deemed to affect only the remedy and does not constitute part of the substantive right.' " Cofer, 473 So.2d at 987 , quoting State Department of Revenue v. Lindsey, 343 So.2d 535, 537 (Ala.Civ.App.1977)."”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““[Wjhere a prescriptive period is contained within the statutory grant of a cause of action, it is a statute of creation, and the period is deemed a portion of the substantive right itself, not subject to tolling provisions. See Nicholson v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc., 278 Ala. 497 , 179 So.2d 76 (1965). On the other hand, where the prescriptive period comes from without the statute, it is a statute of limitations, to which the tolling provisions apply.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. K.D.P. v. F.A.
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.