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474 F.2d 613

Docket No. 72-3256. Summary Calendar.*

Cox v. Otis Engineering Corp.

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1973-03-07

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““that the ship be in navigation; that there be a more or less permanent connection with the ship; and that the worker be aboard primarily to aid in navigation.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including Brown v. Itt Rayonier, Inc.

Applies 33 U.S.C. § 901

Relies on Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York · Offshore Company and the Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, Appellants v. Johnie M. Robison, Appellee-Appellant. Robison v. Offshore Company and the Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York · Bodden v. Coordinated Caribbean Transport, Inc.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by Per Curiam · Decided 1973-03-07

How this case has been cited

Cited by 17 later decisions — most recently October 1997

11 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

100197319801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Charles R. Maloney, Martin A. Welp, Jr., New Orleans, La., for plaintiff-appellant.

John J. Cooper, New Orleans, La., for defendant-appellee.

Before GEWIN, COLEMAN and MORGAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

¶1

Daniel Cox brought suit against Otis Engineering Corporation under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. Sec. 688, and the General Maritime Law for injuries sustained while working as a wireman on the drilling barge, John Haywood. The District Court granted Otis' motion for a summary judgment on the basis that Cox was not a seaman. We affirm.

¶2

Cox's work as a wireline operator did not require him to be assigned to any particular drilling barge in the performance of his duties. Cox was to be on the John Haywood only for two days in performing his work as a wireman.

¶4

There are three essential elements in the term "seaman" as used in the Jones Act. First, the vessel on which the claimant is employed must be in navigation. Second, there must be a more or less permanent connection with the vessel, and third, the claimant must be aboard primarily to aid in navigation.

¶5

Id. at 274. See also Williams v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 5 Cir., 1971, 452 F.2d 955, 958 and Sennett v. Shell Oil Company, 325 F.Supp. 1 (E.D.La.1971). Thus, since Cox was not assigned permanently to a vessel, he cannot be classified as a seaman for purposes of the Jones Act. Offshore Company v. Robison, 5 Cir., 1959, 266 F.2d 769, 779.

¶6

We do not consider on appeal Cox's claim under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 901 et seq., since that matter was not raised at the trial court level. See Coleman v. Associated Pipeline Contractors, Inc., 5 Cir., 1971, 444 F.2d 737, 740, and cases cited therein.

¶7

Affirmed.

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