¶1dissenting.
¶2This case was tried to the court without a jury. There was no appeal taken from the judgment. The appeal was taken from the order of the trial court which declined to grant a motion for a new trial. The majority opinion appears to reexamine the evidence in the manner of an appellate trial de novo or as authorized and limited by Rule 52(a) NDRCivP when findings of fact are challenged. I am left with the impression that an appeal from the denial of a motion for new trial can now be used as a substitute for a timely appeal from the judgment.
¶3I plainly do not agree that there has been a showing in this case of “manifest abuse” of trial court discretion. There was nothing “unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable” about the denial of the motion. See Kraft v. Kraft, 366 N.W.2d 450, 453 (N.D.1985); Kerzmann v. Rohweder, 321 N.W.2d 84, 87 (N.D.1982); Hoge v. Hoge, 281 N.W.2d 557, 560 (N.D.1979); Porter v. Porter, 274 N.W.2d 235, 243 (N.D.1979). I would affirm the order denying the motion.