474 So. 2d 919 - State v. Jones’s Empirical Analysis
1985
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 124 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 127 later decisions — most recently March 2019 · most notably 775 So. 2d 1022 - State v. Casey (2000), 637 So. 2d 1012 - State v. Davis (1994)
2 federal appellate · 124 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · Gregg v. Georgia · Witherspoon v. Illinois · Wainwright v. Witt · Caldwell v. Mississippi
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 127 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“A challenge for cause should be granted, even when a prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror's responses as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice or inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably implied.”
15 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. State v. Jones · State v. Walls“(1) The juror lacks a qualification required by law; (2) The juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality. An opinion or impression as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant shall not of itself be sufficient ground of challenge to a juror, if he declares, and the court is satisfied, that he can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence. (3) The relationship, whether by blood, marriage, employment, friendship, or enmity between the juror and the defendant, the person injured by the offense, the district attorney, or defense counsel, is such that it is reasonable to conclude that it would influence the juror in arriving at a verdict; (4) The juror will not accept the law as given to him by the court; or (5) The juror served on the grand jury that found the indictment, or on a petit jury that once tried the defendant for the same or any other offense.”
7 later decisions quote this exact passage“Defendant complains that the trial court sustained challenges for cause for eight jurors who expressed opposition to the death penalty. He principally argues that the exclusion of all jurors who express scruples about the death penalty constitutes a systematic exclusion of an identifiable segment of the population and that the remaining "death-qualified" jurors are "conviction prone". Acceptance of defendant's argument would require two juries, one (which would not be death-qualified) to determine guilt or innocence and a second jury (which would be death-qualified) to determine sentence. Such a procedure is inconsistent with codal provisions governing the trial of capital cases in Louisiana. Nevertheless, defendant cites Grisby v. Mabry, 569 F.Supp. 1273 (E.D.Ark. 1983), affirmed 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985), in support of his claim and urges this court to rule that death-qualified juries selected under present statutes are not representative of the community. In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), the Court stated that the data in support of a claim that death-qualified jurors are conviction prone was either non-existent or "too tentative and fragmentary" to warrant such a conclusion. 391 U.S. at 517-518 , 88 S.Ct. at 1774-1775 . This court has consistently declined to adopt a contrary view. [citations omitted]”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.