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← 475 F.2d 1066 - Matthew Johnson v. Wayne K. Patterson, Warden, Colorado State Penitentiary

Matthew Johnson v. Wayne K. Patterson, Warden, Colorado State Penitentiary’s Empirical Analysis

475 F.2d 1066 · 1973

Citation profile

73
cited by 73 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
15
states following
July 2023
most recently cited

44 federal appellate · 1 district · 19 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 73 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently July 2023 · most notably United States v. Hale (1975), State v. Bly (1974)

44 federal appellate · 1 district · 19 state decisions — followed in 15 states

610197319801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Griffin v. California · Harris v. New York · Grunewald v. United States · Walder v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 73 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Appellant argues that the comment on Johnson’s failure to tell his story to the police was used to impeach his testimony and therefore falls within the ambit of Harris v. New York, supra, 401 U.S. 222 , 91 S.Ct. 643 , 28 L.Ed.2d 1 . * * * When a defendant makes a statement at trial which is inconsistent with an earlier statement his credibility is clearly in question. This rationale does not follow with silence at the time of arrest. As the trial court properly found in the instant case, silence at the time of arrest is not an inconsistent or contradictory statement. Silence at the time of arrest is simply the exercise of a constitutional right that all persons must enjoy without qualification. (citations omitted) It would indeed be irregular and anomalous to warn an accused that he has the right to remain silent, that if he says anything it may be used against him, however, if he does remain silent that too may be used against him. (citations omitted) This would be the practical effect of allowing the prosecution to use at trial the fact that an accused remained silent, clearly making the assertion of the constitutional right costly. See Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 .” 475 F.2d at 1068. See also Fowle v. United States, 410 F. 2d 48 (9th Cir. 1969); Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1965); and Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 , 77 S.Ct. 963 , 1 L.Ed.2d 931 , 62 A.L.R.2d 1344 (1957).”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““ * * * During cross-examination of Johnson, the following questions and answers took place: Q. Now, Mr. Johnson, you didn’t tell the police this, did you ? A. No, sir. Q. The first time then that anyone has heard this is here today in court, is that correct ? A. No, sir. I told Mr. Hellerstein when he came out to see me in the County Jail. Q. Mr. Hellerstein, your attorney, is that correct ? A. Yes, sir. During closing argument the prosecution again referred to Johnson’s failure to tell the police his story. And isn’t it interesting that this is the first time that he has decided to tell the truth other than, of course, he testified that he told his lawyer, and didn’t bother to tell the police.” 475 F.2d at 1067.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “"My position is that when a defendant testifies he may be impeached like any other witness. The use of pre-trial silence for impeachment depends on whether, in the circumstances presented, there is such inconsistency between silence and testimony as to reasonably permit the use of silence for credibility impeachment. In the case at bar the trial court did not exercise the discretion which it has in this area because there was no contemporaneous objection. I believe that the cross-examination was proper for impeachment purposes because common sense teaches that on arrest for forcible rape an accused will claim consent if such be the fact."”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.