Stokes v. Williams’s Empirical Analysis
475 F.3d 732 · 2007
Citation profile
12 federal appellate ·
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Agostini v. Felton Chancellor Board of Education of the City of New York · Gonzalez v. Crosby · Christopher Artuz Superintendent Green Haven Correctional Facility v. Tony Bruce Bennett · Olle v. Henry & Wright Corp. · Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Courts . . . must apply subsection (b)(6) only as a means to achieve substantial justice when something more than one of the grounds contained in Rule 60(b)'s first five clauses is present.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“As noted previously, [our] Blue Diamond Coal Co. opinion held only “that a change in decisional law is usually not, by itself, an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ meriting Rule 60(b)(6) relief.” (emphasis added). Blue Diamond Coal Co., 249 F.3d at 524 . The decision did not, however, foreclose the possibility that only a change in decisional law might, in some circumstances, merit such relief.... In Overbee 3 for example, we explained that “[n]umerous courts have held that the mere showing of a change in the law is not enough to demonstrate ... an extraordinary situation when the judgment has become final,” but concluded that the unique facts of that case actually compelled the grant of Rule 60(b)(6) relief. 765 F.2d at 580 (emphasis added). Crucial to the court’s determination in Overbee were the facts that, “at the time the plaintiffs filed the motion, the judgment was not final” and that the Ohio Supreme Court had reversed itself within only one year of settling a question of state law. See id. Stokes argues here that similarly persuasive circumstances should have compelled the district court to grant relief from the prior judgment dismissing his habeas corpus petition. However, unlike the situation in Overbee , the original decision in the petitioner’s case had already become final by the time the Rule 60(b) motion was filed. Given this distinction, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in failing to reach the same result as that in Overbee , as a matter”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.