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← 476 F.2d 67 - United States v. Mapp

United States v. Mapp’s Empirical Analysis

476 F.2d 67 · 1973

Citation profile

167
cited by 167 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
21
states following
December 2018
most recently cited

93 federal appellate · 11 district · 34 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 167 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 2018 · most notably South Dakota v. Opperman (1976), United States v. Oates (1977)

93 federal appellate · 11 district · 34 state decisions — followed in 21 states

89019731980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 3052 · 18 U.S.C. § 3109 · 21 U.S.C. § 841 (§ 401 of the Controlled Substances Act) · 21 U.S.C. § 879 (§ 509 of the Controlled Substances Act)

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Chapman v. State of California · Wong Sun v. United States · Johnson v. Zerbst · Carroll v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 167 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. . . . There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate control” — construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Chimel v. California, supra, 395 U.S. at 762-63 , 89 S.Ct. at 204 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “[T]he overarching principles which govern the law of consent are clear. Consent to a search, and the waiver of Fourth Amendment rights which it implies, must be freely and voluntarily given, [citations omitted]. The government bears the burden of proving waiver, a burden which is discharged only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence, [citations omitted]. Waiver of a constitutionally protected interest and “acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights” cannot be presumed, [citations omitted], nor may it lightly be inferred....”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “Exceptions to any possible constitutional rule relating to announcement and entry have been recognized, see Ker v. California, supra, 374 U.S. at 47 [83 S.Ct. [1623] at 1636] (opinion of Brennan, J.), and there is little reason why those limited exceptions might not also apply to § 3109, since they existed at common law, of which the statute is a codification.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.