United States v. Vasquez’s Empirical Analysis
476 F.2d 730 · 1973
Citation profile
46 federal appellate · 1 district · 12 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 69 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2011 · most notably Staples v. United States (1994), United States v. Gordon (1990)
46 federal appellate · 1 district · 12 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 26 U.S.C. § 5845 (§ 201 of the Gun Control Act of 1968) · 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (§ 201 of the Gun Control Act of 1968)
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York · United States v. Freed · Willingham v. Morgan · Sipes v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 69 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“When a person in custody has responded to proper police interrogation by voicing a general willingness to talk, subject only to a limited desire for silence, and his wishes not to discuss a particular subject-matter area are respected, nothing rooted in law or constitutional policy makes it improper to question him as to any unlimited subjects. [9]”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““[I]n order to establish the offenses prohibited by these statutes, there are two essential elements which the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: “First, that the defendant at the time and place charged in the indictment knowingly possessed a firearm, it can be any other weapon or silencer, and “Second, that the firearm or any other weapon or silencer was not then registered to the defendant in the National Firearms Register and Transfer Record. “It is not necessary for the government to prove that the defendant knew that the item described in the indictment was a firearm which the law requires to be registered. What must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant knowingly possessed the item as charged, that such item was a firearm, as defined before, and that it was not then registered to the defendant in the National Firearms Register and Transfer Record.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“In the majority opinion in Freed, Justice Douglas stated the following rule: By the lower court decisions at the time [the Act was amended] the only knowledge required to be proved was knowledge that the instrument possessed was a firearm. See Sipes v. United States, 8 Cir., 321 F.2d 174 , 179, and cases cited. These two explicit references to Sipes and its cited cases, including [United States v.] Decker, [ 292 F.2d 89 (6th Cir.1961)], make it abundantly clear that Justices Douglas and Brennan used the term “firearm” in its general meaning, not in its technical statutory meaning. 476 F.2d 730 , 731-32 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 836 , 94 S.Ct. 181 , 38 L.Ed.2d 72 (1973).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.