McNeill v. Polk’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) The importance of the word or phrase being defined to the resolution of the case. (2) The extent to which the dictionary definition differs from the jury instructions or from the proper legal definition. (3) The extent to which the jury discussed and emphasized the definition. (4) The strength of the evidence and whether the jury had difficulty reaching a verdict prior to introduction of the dictionary definition. (5) Any other factors that relate to a determination of prejudice.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Bauberger v. Haynes · 666 F. Supp. 2d 558 - Bauberger v. Haynes

2. “A state procedural rule is adequate if it is regularly or consistently applied by the state courts, Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 , 108 S.Ct. 1981 , 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988), and it is independent if it does not depend on a federal constitutional ruling, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 , 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985).” McNeill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir.2007). Therefore, a violation of”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 624 F. Supp. 2d 478 - Winston v. Kelly · 878 F. Supp. 2d 633 - Hatfield v. Ballard

3. “We next consider McNeill’s argument that counsel was ineffective by admitting, without McNeill’s consent, that he was guilty of second-degree murder and non-felonious breaking and entering. Under [Nixon ], trial counsel’s performance cannot be constitutionally deficient based solely on his failure to seek McNeill’s consent before admitting guilt to the jury. Instead, McNeill must show that counsel’s decision to admit guilt was objectively unreasonable under the Strickland, standard.... McNeill’s contention that counsel was deficient in admitting that he committed second-degree murder is meritless. The record indicates that McNeill, after a hearing, stipulated to the commission of second-degree murder. At this hearing, McNeill indicated that he understood that the stipulation gave trial counsel the right to argue to the jury that he was guilty of second-degree murder. This argument was consistent with counsel’s strategy of contending that McNeill lacked the mens rea to commit premeditated murder. Further, McNeill’s testimony during trial that he “did not intend to hurt” Lipscomb cannot stand for the proposition that he did not intend to admit he committed second-degree murder, as he now maintains.... [This] supports trial counsel’s guilt phase strategy of arguing that McNeill had a diminished mental capacity due to his emotional state and, therefore, was incapable of committing premeditated murder. It was in this context that McNeill’s statement was offered, and in this contex”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 638 F. Supp. 2d 514 - Jackson v. United States