Doe v. Johnston’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 325 F. Supp. 2d 950 - Atwood v. Mapes

2. “Plaintiffs urge us to retreat from this standard and adopt, instead, a rule whereby prejudice is presumed to result from the introduction of extraneous material. We decline the invitation to do so. A certain amount of leeway must be built into the system so that a relatively minor incident of misconduct is not allowed to disrupt what may have been a lengthy, costly, and otherwise fair trial. We are still convinced that the trial court is in the best position to objectively assess the impact of juror misconduct. Applying this objective standard to the present case, we find the court was well within its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion for new trial.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State of Iowa v. Lee Samuel Christensen

3. “Moreover, as the district court noted, such an interpretation is consistent with a plain reading of the rule. By its terms, the rule makes the triggering event the same as the act giving rise to negligence. In this case that would be the 1985 blood transfusion, not the diagnosis of AIDS revealed in 1987. We hold that the blood transfusion given in 1985 was the event triggering the protection of rule 407, not the doctor’s later knowledge of his patient’s injury.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Tucker v. Caterpillar, Inc.