Reed v. Campbell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

10 federal appellate · 1 district · 165 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 191 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “After an estate has been finally distributed, the interest in finality may provide an additional, valid justification for barring the belated assertion of claims, even though they may be meritorious and even though mistakes of law or fact may have occurred during the probate.”

   13 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Dickson v. Simpson · Turner v. Perry County Coal Corp.

2. “Although the question presented in this case is framed in terms of “retroactivity,” its answer is governed by a rather clear distinction that has emerged from our Oases considering the constitutionality of statutory provisions that impose special burdens on illegitimate children .... The state interest in the orderly disposition of decedents’ estates may justify the imposition of special requirements upon an illegitimate child who asserts a right to inherit from her father, and, of course, it justifies the enforcement of generally applicable limitations on the time and the manner in which claims may be asserted .... Although the administration of Prince Ricker’s estate was in progress ... the test applied by the Texas court resulted in the denial of appellant’s claim because of the conjunction of two facts: (1) her father died before April 26, 1977, and (2) her claim was filed after April 26, 1977. There is nothing in the record to explain why these two facts, either separately or in combination, should have prevented the applicability of Trimble .... The state interest in the orderly administration of Prince Ricker’s estate would have been served equally well regardless of how the merits of the claim were resolved. In this case, then, neither the date of his death nor the date the claim was filed had any impact on the relevant state interest in orderly administration; their conjunction similarly had no impact on that state interest.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ka'u Agribusiness Co. v. Heirs of Ahulau · Hart v. Posey

3. “[A] rather clear distinction ... has emerged from our cases considering the constitutionality of statutory provisions that impose special burdens on illegitimate children. In these cases, we have unambiguously concluded that a State may not justify discriminatory treatment of illegiti-mates in order to express its disapproval of their parents’ misconduct. We have, however, also recognized that there is a permissible basis for some “distinctions made in part on the basis of legitimacy;” specifically we have upheld statutory provisions that have an evident and substantial relation to the State’s interest in providing for the orderly and just distribution of a decedent’s property at death. The state interest in the orderly disposition of decedent’s estates may justify the imposition of special requirements upon an illegitimate child who asserts a right to inherit from her father, and, of course, it justified the enforcement of generally applicable limitations on the time and the manner in which claims may be asserted.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Wasser v. Collins · Matter of Estate of King