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← 477 F.2d 244 - Elizabeth Ann Duke v. The State of Texas

Elizabeth Ann Duke v. The State of Texas’s Empirical Analysis

477 F.2d 244 · 1973

Citation profile

56
cited by 56 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
April 2022
most recently cited

27 federal appellate · 3 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 56 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2022 · most notably Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd. (1975), Juidice v. Vail (1977)

27 federal appellate · 3 district · 1 state decisions

360197319801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2283 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Younger v. Harris · Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. · Dombrowski v. Pfister · Zwickler v. Koota · Samuels v. J Mackell Fernandez

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 56 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “‘Where a state court and a court of the United States may each take jurisdiction, the tribunal which first gets it holds it to the exclusion of the other, until its duty is fully performed and the jurisdiction invoked is exhausted; and this rule applies alike in both civil and criminal cases.’ Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 366, 370 [ 21 L.Ed. 287 ] (1873).”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The plaintiffs below made no effort to utilize orderly state court procedures before resort to the federal system. The refusal by the state trial court to consider Duke and Haylon’s federal constitutional claims, see note 4, supra, did not alter the duty to pursue state remedies. Mere errors or mistakes by the state trial court are not special circumstances which justify federal intervention, cf. Lynch v. Snepp, supra, 472 F.2d 769 at 775-76 (4 Cir.). Other courts have indicated that failure to pursue state appellate remedies is a factor to be considered in refusing federal intervention in an ongoing state civil proceeding, Lynch v. Snepp, supra, 472 F.2d at 775-76 ; cf. Cousins v. Wigoda, supra, 463 F.2d 603 at 607-08 (7 Cir.). A party may not invoke the aid of a federal court, alleging that his state remedies are inadequate, without having first tested the sufficiency of those remedies and having found them to be wanting.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “The Court in Younger v. Harris, reproduced the language in Dombrowski v. Pfister, that suggests that delay in obtaining appellate disposition may be a sufficient “extraordinary circumstance” justifying federal intervention to prevent irreparable harm: But the allegations in this complaint depict a situation in which defense of the State’s criminal prosecution will not assure adequate vindication of constitutional rights. They suggest that a substantial loss of or impairment of freedoms of expression will occur if appellants must await the state court’s disposition and ultimate review in this Court of any adverse determination. These allegations, if true, clearly show irreparable injury.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.