Benjamin Jones v. James T. Lynn’s Empirical Analysis
477 F.2d 885 · 1973
Citation profile
65 federal appellate · 16 district · 2 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 104 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently September 2003 · most notably Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo (1982), Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway (1975)
65 federal appellate · 16 district · 2 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 29 U.S.C. § 201 (American Samoa Labor Standards Amendments of 1956) · 42 U.S.C. § 1450 · 42 U.S.C. § 1456 · 42 U.S.C. § 1857 · 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (§ 101 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969) · 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (§ 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969)
Relies on Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala. · United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n · Illinois v. City of Milwaukee · Lichter v. United States · Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 104 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““The defendants’ argument in this respect proceeds from the premise that even though there be a clear violation of the Act, even though, as the district court stated, the responsible federal agency failed to ‘assemble all pertinent information, to subject it to expert scrutiny and to articulate clearly and in writing an evaluation of the various benefits and costs which are being balanced’, that no judicial relief may be afforded the plaintiffs absent a showing on their part that the project would be damaging to the environment. We think the district court’s rejection of this theory is particularly relevant: “to suggest that when the federal agencies flatly fail to perform this function, a plaintiff in a lawsuit such as this suit must perform it as a condition to obtaining injunctive relief is to suggest that one of the central purposes of the Act be frustrated.” To accept the defendants’ argument on this point would thwart the Congressional mandate by rendering impotent the procedural requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. What this argument attempts to do is to shift the burdens of considering and evaluating the environmental consequences of particular federal actions from the agencies Congress intended to bear them to the public, the beneficiary of this legislation. If these agencies were permitted to avoid their responsibilities under the Act until an individual citizen, who possesses vastly inferior resources, could demonstrate environmental harm,”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“is not an authorization to undo what has already been done .... Rather, the question must be what agency decisions are yet to be made, and what decisions, although already made, remain open to revision. Completion is not measured by counting bricks in situ; nor by measuring as yet unpaid federal aid. Nor do we have the comparatively simple problem of a purely federal project. . .. Commitments have been made to non-federal participants, as to whom, in the total mix, it would be inequitable to back out. 54”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage““one initial comprehensive study, which could be referred to and supplemented by less comprehensive individual studies for each parcel, would appear to reflect a better use of scarce resources. See, e. g., Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F.Supp. 1289 (S.D.Tex.1973) . . .. [I]t would not seem sensible to adopt the piecemeal approach which HUD seeks to adopt, whereby it will prepare a modified impact statement separately for each proposed construction as a mortgage insurance application is filed, an approach akin to equating an appraisal of each tree to one of the forest. If HUD is expected to be part of the financing of most of the unplanned and/or undeveloped parcels, it seems a perversion of NEPA for it to approach each parcel, wholly depending in its timing of environmental review on the filing of applications for assistance and considering anew the scene as it is changed by each subsequent approval. Not only would this be wasteful of bureaucratic resources, but the plurality of possible appeals would suggest a wasteful prolongation of time spent in litigation.” Jones v, Lynn, 477 F.2d 885, 890-91 (1st Cir. 1973).”
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Aertsen v. Landrieu
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.