Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 477 FSUPP 891 - Liang v. Hunt

Liang v. Hunt’s Empirical Analysis

1979

Citation profile

15
cited by 15 later decisions
September 2000
most recently cited

4 federal appellate ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 15 later decisions — most recently September 2000

4 federal appellate ·

1201979198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1 (§ 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act) · 15 U.S.C. § 78I (§ 9 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 7 U.S.C. § 13 · 7 U.S.C. § 18 · 7 U.S.C. § 6A · 7 U.S.C. § 6B

Relies on Cort v. Ash · Cannon v. University of Chicago · Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington · Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois · Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “As previously indicated, examination of the statute and its genesis shows that Chris-Craft (a defeated tender-offerer) is not an intended beneficiary of the Williams Act, and surely is not one 'for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.' Ibid. To the contrary, Chris-Craft is a member of the class whose activities Congress intended to regulate for the protection and benefit of an entirely distinct class, shareholders-offerees. As a party whose previously unregulated conduct was purposefully brought under federal control by the statute, Chris-Craft can scarcely lay claim to the status of 'beneficiary' whom Congress considered in need of protection.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Excessive speculation in any commodity under contracts of sale of such commodity for future delivery ... causing sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price of such commodity, is an undue and unnecessary burden on interstate commerce in such commodity”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “the excessive speculation provision is primarily intended to protect outsiders from the activities of all speculators, not speculators from themselves.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.