IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
MARLON LORENZO BROWN, No. 79971
Appellant,
vs.
MIKE SLYMAN, AN INDIVIDUAL;
EASY BAIL, LLC, A NEVADA LIMITED
FILED
LIABILITY COMPANY; AND DEC 2 3 2020
AMERICAN SURETY COMPANY, EL1ZABE I A. BROWN
CLERK OF
Res • ondents.
BY
EPUTY CLERK
ORDER REVERSING AND REMANDING
This is a pro se appeal from a district court order dismissing a
complaint. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Susan Johnson,
Judge.
Appellant contends that the district court erred by dismissing
his complaint. Because appellant's complaint alleged fraud, it was subject
to a heightened pleading requirement despite his pro se status. See NRCP
9(b) (requiring fraud claims to "state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud"); Rodriguez v. Fiesta Palms, LLC,
(2018) C[I]n general, the rules of civil procedure
'cannot be applied differently merely because a party not learned in the law
"The notice of appeal also designates a minute order denying a motion
for reconsideration and for leave to amend. Aside from there being no
written order resolving that motion, any such order would not be
appealable. See NRAP 3A(b) (listing orders and judgments in a civil action
that are appealable); Alvis v. State, Gaining Control Bd.,
(1987) (explaining that the district court's minute order is ineffective
and cannot be appealed).
zD - 4 631 g
is acting pro se."' (quoting Bonnell v. Lawrence,
(2006) (noting that there are no exceptions to NRCP 9(b)'s heightened
pleading requirement), abrogated on other grounds by Buzz Stew, LLC v.
City of N. Las Vegas,
(2008).
Appellant failed to meet this heightened standard. While the
complaint alleged general wrongdoing and a broad timeframe, it lacked
sufficient specificity. For example, it failed to allege any specific dates or
times; any representations that respondent Easy Bail, LLC, made that
appellant relied upon to his detriment; or that respondent Mike Slyman
knew about the allegedly fraudulent transactions leading up to his
ownership of the vehicle at issue. See Rocker,
(9th Cir. 2007)
(discussing the federal counterpart to NRCP 9(b) and stating that "Rule 9(b)
does not allow a complaint to merely lump multiple defendants together but
`require[s] plaintiffs to differentiate their allegations when suing more than
one defendant . . . and inform each defendant separately of the allegations
surrounding his alleged participation in the fraud (alterations in original)
(quoting Haskin v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
(M.D. Fla. 1998))).
Nevertheless, the district court erred by dismissing appellant's
complaint, as a plaintiffs failure "to comply with NRCP 9(b) . . . only
subjects the complaint to a motion for a more definite statement, or at the
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
2
(01 1947A .(01135
very worst to dismissal with leave to amend."2 Britz v. Consol. Casinos
Corp.,
(1971). Because the district court
failed to grant either in this case, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED and
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order.
-"c24)1612121"464°I.m.w..7 j.
Parraguirre
, J.
Hardesty
J.
Cadish
cc: Hon. Susan Johnson, District Judge
Marlon Lorenzo Brown
Pitaro & Fumo, Chtd.
Eighth District Court Clerk
2 Respondents failed to file an answering brief after being directed to
do so, see NRAP 46A(c), such that they confessed error on this issue. See
NRAP 31(d)(2).
3
