Lynn v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"A conviction of felony cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission *Page 181 of the offense, and such corroborative evidence, if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof, is not sufficient."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Watts v. State · 544 So. 2d 177 - Kimbrough v. State

2. “"Lynn further seeks reversal of his conviction on constitutional grounds allegedly arising from the trial court's grant of the prosecution's motion in limine. Appellant contends that under the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. Alaska , [ 415 U.S. 308 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974)], the present construction of the Alabama Juvenile Code which precludes cross-examination of a witness relative to his juvenile record violates both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 6, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901. "Both of these constitutional provisions guarantee a criminal defendant's right to confront witnesses against him [including the right to cross-examine]. . . . Lynn's reliance on Davis for the proposition that defendants should be permitted to cross-examine witnesses against them as to their juvenile records for impeachment purposes, however, is misplaced. The Davis decision simply does not so hold. "In Davis , the trial court granted the State's motion in limine precluding the defendant from attempting to show a State witness's bias by questioning him regarding his juvenile record. In reversing the conviction, the Supreme Court distinguished efforts to impeach generally from efforts to prove a witness's bias: "`Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Subject always to the broad discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 477 So. 2d 1385 - Ex Parte Lynn

3. “"Prior to calling Garrett Marcus Strong [an admitted accomplice to the crime] to testify, the prosecution made an oral motion in limine which was argued in chambers, outside the presence of the jury. The motion requested that Counsel for the defendant be precluded from any inquiry into Strong's juvenile record. The trial court granted the motion, stating that such evidence was not admissible for impeachment purposes and instructing Lynn's lawyers not to mention Strong's juvenile record in any way. . . .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 477 So. 2d 1385 - Ex Parte Lynn