Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 477 U.S. 242 - Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

1986

Citation profile

214,053
cited by 214,053 later decisions
99
cited 99 times by the Supreme Court
49
states following
March 2026
most recently cited

22,005 federal appellate · 52,410 district · 4,268 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 214,053 later decisions (99 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2026 · most notably Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H (1986), Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992)

22,005 federal appellate · 52,410 district · 4,268 state decisions — followed in 49 states

75k019861990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Appellate journey

reviewedLiberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson (from District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals)

Relationships

Relies on Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation · Jackson v. Virginia · Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.

Cited together with Celotex Corporation v. Catrett H · Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation · Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. · McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green · United States v. Diebold, Inc.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 214,053 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
    8,851 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “* Cases involving state of mind issues are not necessarily inappropriate for summary judgment. * The movant must meet the initial burden of showing “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact” as to an essential element of the non-movant’s case. This burden may be met by pointing out to the court that the respondent, having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his or her case. * The respondent cannot rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant’s denial of a disputed fact, but must “present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” * The trial court no longer has the duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact. * The trial court has more discretion than in the “old era” in evaluating the respondent’s evidence. The respondent must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Further, “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find” for the respondent, the motion should be granted. The trial court has at least some discretion to determine whether the respondent’s claim is plausible.”
    533 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “is not to weigh the evidence but is instead required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and to eschew credibility assessments.”
    155 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How later courts have treated this case

Across 376 classified citations — whether each later court relied on, limited, or rejected this decision:

  • 270followed
  • 65cited without characterization
  • 41explained

Treatment is classified from each citing court's own sentence. This is a running sample — coverage grows as the classification pass proceeds; overrulings are also tracked authoritatively in the case status.