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478 F.2d 332

Docket No. 72-2513.

Bender v. United States

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided May 2, 1973.

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1973-05-02

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently April 1976

3 federal appellate ·

2 counsel of record

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2113 · 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on McCarthy v. United States · Halliday v. United States · Corallo v. United States

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1973-05-02

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¶1Essick McKinley Bender, in pro. per.

¶2William D. Keller, U. S. Atty., William John Rathje, Vincent J. Marella, Eric A. Nobles, Asst. U. S. Attys., Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellee.

¶3Before DUNIWAY, HUFSTEDLER, and CHOY, Circuit Judges.

¶4CHOY, Circuit Judge:

¶5Bender appeals the denial without a hearing of his post-conviction petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We affirm.

¶6On November 6, 1967 he pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), robbery of a savings and loan association with a dangerous weapon. The trial *333judge fully complied with the requirements of Rule 11, F.R.Crim.P. to ensure voluntariness of the plea, except that he did not explicitly tell appellant that his federal sentence would not commence until his pending state sentences ran their course. The trial judge did tell him immediately after his plea was accepted that the court was powerless to impose a federal sentence to run concurrently with any state confinement.

¶7On November 27, 1967 the trial judge sentenced appellant to fifteen years imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4208 (a)(2). The commencement of his federal sentence was delayed by one hundred and four days.

¶8On April 25, 1972 appellant filed his § 2255 petition on the ground that his guilty plea was not made with full understanding of its consequences because he was not advised, prior to pleading, of the delay in the start of his federal sentence. He relies on United States v. Myers, 451 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1972). The district court held that Myers was not retroactively applicable, but as a matter of grace it reduced appellant’s sentence by one hundred and four days.

¶9We agree that Myers should not be retroactively applied. The two eases which initiated the prophylactic interpretation of Rule 11 were not applied retroactively. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969) was held not retroactive in Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 89 S.Ct. 1498, 23 L.Ed.2d 16 (1969). Heiden v. United States, 353 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1965) was held not retroactive in Castro v. United States, 396 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1968). See also Myers, supraat 405 of 451 F.2d. This Court also held that the admonishment of unavailability of parole required by Munich v. U. S., 337 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1964) was not required to be applied retroactively. Fong v. U. S., 411 F.2d 1181, 1182 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 396 U.S. 968, 90 S.Ct. 450, 24 L.Ed.2d 434 (1969). The rationale for the Myers and Munich decisions was quite similar, with Myers relying upon Munich.

¶10As to the district court’s act of grace in reducing appellant’s sentence by one hundred and four days: While that act is of dubious validity,1 we do not disturb it since the government does not object thereto.

¶11Affirmed.

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