LeBlanc v. Henderson

¶6JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge:

¶7This appeal is taken from denial of a writ of habeas corpus below on grounds that (i) Appellant’s conviction in the State Court resulted from a plea of guilty entered by his appointed counsel in violation of Article 553 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure1 and (ii) the plea of guilty was neither voluntary, or knowingly made.2

¶8A brief recital of the events preceding this appeal will suffice. Donner Joseph LeBlanc was arraigned on February 12, 1970 at which time he was accused of armed robbery which carries a sentence of five (5) to ninety-nine (99) years imprisonment in Louisiana. He entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. On June 10, 1970, just prior to the trial, LeBlanc withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty, waiving all delays for sentencing. He subsequently was sentenced to a term of six years at hard labor without the benefit of parole.

¶9On June 8, 1971, LeBlanc filed a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of Louisiana. An evidentiary hearing was held after which the Defendant’s request for the writ was denied. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Louisiana the writ was again denied. Rel. LeBlanc v. Henderson, 261 La. 315, 259 So.2d 557.

¶10Having exhausted his state remedies, LeBlanc filed the present petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court. Regarding Appellant’s first assertion listed above, the Court below found, and we think correctly so, that it challenged only adherence to state statutory procedures and *483failed to raise a federal constitutional question.3

¶11Regarding Appellant’s second contention, the Trial Court below distinguished this case from Boykin4 on the grounds that the first habeas corpus petition in the State Court resulted in a post-conviction evidentiary hearing which established that LeBlanc’s guilty plea was voluntary. In answer to Appellant’s contention that he was unaware of his ineligibility for parole, the Trial Court correctly held, as we have, that a trial judge is not required to inform a defendant of his ineligibility for parole. Onick v. United States, 5 Cir., 1970, 425 F.2d 1292, cert. denied, 1970, 400 U.S. 846, 91 S.Ct. 92, 27 L.Ed.2d 83; Sanchez v. United States, 5 Cir., 1969, 417 F.2d 494; Trujillo v. United States, 5 Cir., 1967, 377 F.2d 266, cert. denied, 1967, 389 U.S. 899, 88 S.Ct. 224, 19 L.Ed.2d 221. While we agree with the lower courts’ treatment in respect to a trial court’s absence of duty to warn a defendant of his ineligibility for parole and under the circumstances of this case, we agree with its acceptance of evidence obtained in a post-conviction hearing as curative of the otherwise defective trial transcript, we hasten to point out that a post-conviction hearing is not a panacea. The Supreme Court stated in Boykin:

“What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence. When the judge discharges that function, he leaves a record adequate for any review that may be later sought . and forestalls the spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky memories.” 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274.

¶12This language italicized bespeaks of precisely what normally occurs in a post-conviction evidentiary hearing. The meaning of Boykin is manifestly clear. It is error, plain on the face of the record, for a trial judge to accept a guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it is intelligently and voluntarily made. This Court will continue to scrutinize with guarded caution those situations, such as this one where the *484reviewing court cannot ascertain from the trial transcript that the stringent due process requirements imposed upon the states by Boykin v. Alabama, supra, have been complied with scrupulously.

¶13But because of the overwhelming showing in the state habeas hearing that the plea was in fact knowingly made with awareness of its consequences 5 in respect of those requirements having constitutional statute, we conclude that the District Court could so find.

¶14Affirmed.