IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
STEVEN NELSON MURRAY, No. 80392
Appellant,
VS. FILE
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent. DEC 1 4 2020
ELIZABETH A. BROWN
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE By
DEPUTY'Ll.rR1(
C
This is an appeal from a district court order denying a
postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Eighth Judicial District
Court, Clark County; Michelle Leavitt, Judge.
Appellant Steven Murray was convicted of driving and/or being
in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of a
controlled substance causing substantial bodily harm in violation of NRS
484.3795 (2007), and vehicular homicide in violation of NRS 484.37955
(2007). Murray appealed from the judgment of conviction, and we affirmed
on February 28, 2011.1 Murray then filed two postconviction petitions for a
writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied. We affirmed those
denials.2 He filed the current postconviction petition on May 10, 2019, over
eight years after issuance of remittitur on direct appeal on February 28,
2011. The district court therefore did not err in concluding this petition is
untimely and successive. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2). And
thus, Murray's petition is procedurally barred absent a demonstration of
1 See Murray v. State, Docket No. 54115 (Order of Affirmance, Feb. 3,
2011).
'See Murray v. State, Docket No. 59067 (Order of Affirmance, Mar. 7,
2012); Murray v. State, Docket No. 68221 (Order of Affirmance, Dec. 16,
2015).
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good cause and actual prejudice, see NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b),
which the district court found Murray did not establish.
Murray contends that the ruling in McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S.
Ct. 1500 (2018), provides grounds for postconviction relief, arguing he
entered into a stipulation without being fully informed of its effect and that
the stipulation therefore violated his autonomy right as set forth in McCoy.
After carefully reviewing the record in this case, we conclude McCoy does
not apply here. McCoy held "that a defendant has the right to insist that
counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel's experiencedbased view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to
avoid the death penalty." 138 S. Ct. at 1505. But Murray's counsel did not
concede guilt and, moreover, unlike the defendant in McCoy, Murray did
not object at trial. See id. at 1506, 1509 (noting McCoy objected to defense
counsel's admission of guilt and contrasting that situation to the one in
Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 181 (2004), where the defendant did not
object to the proposed trial strategy despite having knowledge of it). Indeed,
the stipulation did not relieve the State of its burden to prove all of the
factual elements of the crimes charged. And even assuming, arguendo, that
Murray did not fully understand the stipulation,3 we conclude that the
3The record does not support Murray's argument that he was not fully
informed of the effect of entering into the stipulation. To the extent Murray
argues he was inadequately canvassed, that argument is barred by our
decision in Murray, Docket No. 59067 (Order of Affirmance, Mar. 7, 2012),
wherein we recognized that he was personally canvassed and indicated his
understanding of the stipulation. See Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 879,
34 P.3d 519, 532 (2001) (explaining that claims previously raised in a
postconviction petition, rejected by the district court, and upheld on appeal,
are barred by the law of the case doctrine), abrogated on other grounds by
Rippo v. State, 134 Nev. 411, 423 n.12,
423 P.3d 1094, 1097 n.12 (2018).
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stipulation was a trial management strategy and did not infringe upon
Murray's trial objectives, and therefore does not fall under McCoy's holding.
See id. at 1508-09 (recognizing that counsel and the court maintain their
respective trial management roles and differentiating between "strategic
choices about how best to achieve a client's objectivee and "choices about
what the client's objectives in fact are). Accordingly, Murray fails to show
good cause, the district court did not err by denying Murray's petition as
procedurally barred, and we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
J.
J.
Stiglich
J.
Silver
cc: Hon. Michelle Leavitt, District Judge
Federal Public Defender/Las Vegas
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
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