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478 So. 2d 22

Docket No. 65495.

State v. Hicks

STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Carl Lee HICKS, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Florida

Decided May 23, 1985.

Supreme Court of Florida · decided 1985-10-31

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“respond in any manner to the revocation charges.”

quoted by 3 later decisions, including Tyler v. State, Collins v. State

“We note at the outset that there is no constitutional requirement for the appointment of counsel in all probation revocation hearings... . We predicate our decision here on the ground that a uniform rule in all probation revocation hearings is more easily understood and easier to administer than requiring attorneys in some cases but not in others.... Judge Downey, writing for the district court, has cogently stated reasons to adopt the ruling we make. We doubt that we could improve upon his opinion and therefore adopt it as the opinion of this Court.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 509 So. 2d 919 - Floyd v. PAROLE AND PROBATION COM'N

Relies on Gagnon v. Scarpelli · 452 So. 2d 606 - Hicks v. State · Sanderson v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1985-10-31

How this case has been cited

Cited by 18 later decisions — most recently October 2014

18 state decisions

801985199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

On Rehearing October 31, 1985.

¶1*23 Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Carolyn V. McCann, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for petitioner.

¶2Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender and Margaret Good, Asst. Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, for respondent.

¶3Enoch J. Whitney, Gen. Counsel, Tallahassee, amicus curiae for Florida Parole and Probation Com'n.

¶4McDONALD, Justice.

¶5We accepted jurisdiction of Hicks v. State, 452 So.2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), because of conflict with Sanderson v. State, 447 So.2d 374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, and we approve Hicks.

¶6The issue in this case is whether a person subject to probation revocation has an absolute right to counsel in such a proceeding, and, if so, whether the right must be afforded him before he is required to admit or deny the revocation charges. We hold that unless there has been an informed waiver thereof such a person is entitled to counsel, and it must be afforded him before he is required to respond in any manner to the revocation charges.

¶7We note at the outset that there is no constitutional requirement for the appointment of counsel in all probation revocation hearings. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). We predicate our decision here on the ground that a uniform rule in all probation revocation hearings is more easily understood and easier to administer than requiring attorneys in some cases but not in others. We do not believe that a uniform requirement will unduly tax the resources of the public defender system; we believe it will result in a more orderly and uniform administration of the criminal justice system.[*] Judge Downey, writing for the district court, has cogently stated reasons to adopt the ruling we make. We doubt that we could improve upon his opinion and *24 therefore adopt it as the opinion of this Court.

¶8The opinion of the district court of appeal is approved.

¶9It is so ordered.

¶10BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.

¶11ADKINS and ALDERMAN, JJ., dissent.

¶12

ON REHEARING

¶13PER CURIAM.

¶14On rehearing we are asked to decide whether this decision, which related to a probation violation, is also applicable to a parole violation hearing. We should not address on rehearing an issue that was not presented, essential, or directly germane to the case under review and therefore decline to decide the applicability of our holding to parole violations.

¶15We do feel that it is appropriate to determine whether our holding relative to probation violations is retroactive or prospective in its application to other probation violation hearings. We hold that it has prospective application only.

¶16It is so ordered.

¶17BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.

NOTES

¶18[*] Further, a probation revocation usually leads to sentencing; an attorney is required at a sentencing proceeding. It seems illogical not to mandate an attorney when revocation is likely to lead to incarceration and to require an attorney only when the length of that incarceration is being decided.

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