Hernandez v. Hernandez

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided November 12, 1985

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1985-11-12

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently May 1990

3 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“(1) the petitioner presently has the ability to comply with the order and willfully refuses to do so, or (2) that the petitioner previously had the ability to comply, but divested himself of that ability through his fault or neglect designed to frustrate the intent and purpose of the order.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 561 So. 2d 6 - Pradas v. Pradas

Relies on 339 So. 2d 650 - Faircloth v. Faircloth · 72 So. 2d 280 - Moore v. Lee · 122 So. 2d 30 - Ginsberg v. Ginsberg

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1985-11-12

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PER CURIAM.

¶1After a decree of dissolution of marriage has become final, service of a notice, upon the attorney who represented the petitioner in the original divorce action, of a hearing to enforce or modify that decree is not adequate or proper where (1) it does not result in petitioner receiving notice of the proceeding, and (2) the attorney disclaims continued representation of the petitioner. See Moore v. Lee, 72 So.2d 280 (Fla.1954); Ginsberg v. Ginsberg, 122 So.2d 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960).

¶2An order of contempt for nonpayment of alimony and support which lacks specific findings that the petitioner either (1) has the ability to comply with the order and willfully refuses to do so, or (2) previously had the ability to comply but divested himself of that ability through his fault or neglect designed to frustrate the intent and purpose of the order, is fatally defective. Faircloth v. Faircloth, 339 So.2d 650 (Fla.1976).

¶3Reversed and remanded.