Moore v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

19 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The policy at the base of the exercise of the police power here is to create a special deterrence to the direction of physical force against [those] upon whom the security of the community depends.” We believe that the societal rationale for imposing death for one who kills a law enforcement official is promoted only if the defendant knew that the victim was a law enforcement official at the time of the lolling.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Castor v. State · Stevens v. State

2. “The trial court thereupon conducted a hearing to determine the voluntariness of Appellant's guilty pleas. The trial court examined Appellant about his mental status and about his knowledge of the many constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. The trial court specifically informed Appellant of the minimum and maximum penalties he faced by pleading guilty as charged and reminded Appellant that the State was seeking a death penalty for him. The trial court also carefully advised Appellant that by pleading guilty he would waive his right to have a jury recommend to the trial court whether or not a death penalty should be imposed against Appellant. Appellant consistently stated, without equivocation, that he understood everything that the trial court was discussing with him and that he knew what he was doing. Appellant also stated his belief that he had been adequately and satisfactorily represented by his counsel and that he had not been forced, threatened or induced in any way to enter his guilty pleas. We note that there was no plea agreement in this case. A factual basis for Appellant's three guilty pleas was presented to the trial court by the State and Appellant confessed three different times to having committed the three murders charged in Counts I, II, and III. Having carefully and comprehensively examined Appellant, the trial court accepted Appellant's guilty pleas and found Appellant guilty of the three murder counts.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Moore v. State

3. “The State concedes that the United States Constitution protects an accused against criminal conviction "except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In Re Winship, (1970) 3297 U.S. 358 , 364, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073 . In Daniels [v. State (1983), Ind., 453 N.E.2d 160 ], we found that Ind.Code § 85-50-2-9(g) complies with the proscription articulated in Winship since the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one of the enumerated aggravating cireumstances. Moreover, we specifically decided upon Appellant's argument as follows: "However, the determination of the weight to be accorded the aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not a 'fact' which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but is a balancing process." Daniels, 453 N.E.2d at 171 . Appellant now suggests that this language was dicta because Daniels involved a jury trial in which the jury was instructed to follow the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in finding the existence of aggravating factors and in the weight determination implicit in the requisite balancing process. Notwithstanding this distinction, we expressly adopt the language of the above quoted passage from Daniels and hold that it is constitutional to not require a finding that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating cireumstanc-es beyond a reasonable doubt. (Emphasis in original.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Spranger v. State