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48 Cal. 2d 69

In Re Boyd

California Supreme Court

Decided March 1, 1957

California Supreme Court · decided 1957-03-01

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“`everything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals' ( In re McAllister, 14 Cal.2d 602, 603 [ 95 P.2d 932 ]; In re Hatch, 10 Cal.2d 147, 150 [ 73 P.2d 885 ]) and as `[a]n act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man' ( In re Boyd, 48 Cal.2d 69, 70 [ 307 P.2d 625 ]; In re Craig, 12 Cal.2d 93, 97 [ 82 P.2d 442 ]).”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 65 Cal. 2d 447 - Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 89 Cal. App. 3d 30 - Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Etc. Appeals Bd.

“In bar discipline proceedings under section 6101 of the Business and Professions Code, the respondent's conviction of an offense stands as conclusive proof that the accused committed all acts necessary to constitute the offense.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 17 Cal. 3d 416 - In Re Duggan

Relies on In Re Phillips · Board of Dental Examiners v. Lazzell · Marsh v. State Bar of California

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1957-03-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 32 later decisions — most recently January 2014 · most notably 1 Cal. 3d 214 - Morrison v. State Board of Education (1969), Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968)

32 state decisions

1601957196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

THE COURT.

¶1 This is a proceeding predicated on an order of this court directing petitioner, an attorney at law, to show cause why he should not be disciplined pursuant to the provisions of section 6101 of the Business and Professions Code, and his return thereto.

¶2 Petitioner pleaded guilty to violating subdivision 5 of section 647 of the Penal Code (vagrancy). It is there provided, among other things, that every lewd or dissolute person is a vagrant and punishable as for a misdemeanor. The record discloses that on June 28, 1953, petitioner committed an act prohibited by this section of the Penal Code. Section 6101 of the Business and Professions Code provides that conviction of a felony or misdemeanor, involving moral turpitude, constitutes a cause for discipline of an attorney at law.

¶3 This is the sole question for us to determine: Bid *70 the acts constituting the offense to which petitioner pleaded guilty involve moral turpitude?

¶4 Yes. Moral turpitude has been defined as: “An act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man.” (Bouvier, Law Dictionary [Rawle’s 3d rev. 8th ed. 1914], p. 2247; see also Ballentine, Law Dictionary [1948], p. 832; Black, Law Dictionary [4th ed. 1951], p. 1160; Marsh v. State Bar of California, 210 Cal. 303, 307 [2] [291 P. 583].)

¶5 No citation of authority or argument is needed to support the conclusion that the conduct of petitioner fell within the purview of the above definition. His offense was one of depravity, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, and was therefore an offense involving moral turpitude. The act was committed in a public place. Without further recitation of the facts, it is enough to say that such conduct is unworthy of a member of the legal profession.

¶6 This court in In re Phillips, 17 Cal.2d 55 [109 P.2d 344, 132 A.L.R. 644], sustained the disbarment of an attorney pursuant to section 6102 of the Business and Professions Code where the record disclosed that he had been convicted of “indecent exposure,” thus holding that indecent exposure involved moral turpitude.

¶7 Brun v. Lazzell, 172 Md. 314 [191 A. 240, 243, 109 A.L.R. 1453], and Kravis v. Hock, 135 N.J.L. 259 [51 A.2d 441, 442], also hold that indecent exposure and lewd acts in public involve moral turpitude.

¶8 It is ordered that petitioner be suspended from the practice of law in this state for a period of three years commencing 30 days after the date of filing of this order.

¶9 Petitioner’s application for a rehearing was denied March 27, 1957, and the time for commencement of his suspension from the practice of law was extended to begin June 1, 1957.

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