Chacon v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “1. In order to qualify for the PSOB Act death benefit,.a claimant must demonstrate that a “public safety officer [was] found to have died as the direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in the line of duty[.]” 2. The term “public safety officer” means an “individual serving a public agency in an official capacity, with or without compensation, as a law enforcement officer, as a firefighter, as a chaplain, or as a member of a rescue squad or ambulance crew[.]” 3. While the PSOBA does not specifically define “member of a rescue squad or ambulance [crew],” the statutory definition of “firefighter” encompasses: “an individual serving [as] an officially recognized or designated public employee member of a rescue squad or ambulance crew[.]” 4. 42 U.S.C. § 3796b(4) makes PSOBA death benefits available only to deceased public employee members of rescue squads or ambulance crews. 5. To the extent that the 28 C.F.R. 32.2(o) definition of “rescue squad or ambulance crew member” is construed by the hearing officer so as not to require that the ambulance crew public safety officer be a “public employee member” of such crew or squad at the time of death, I find such regulatory interpretation to be contrary with the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 3796 (b), subordinate to statutory interpretation and, thus, inapplicable in this matter. 6. The meaning of the language “serving a public agency in an official capacity,” as that language is used to define a “public safety officer,””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Hillensbeck v. United States · Hillensbeck v. United States

2. “When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. White v. United States · Song v. United States

3. “In any case in which the Bureau of Justice Assistance (hereinafter in this subchapter referred to as the “Bureau”) determines, under regulations issued pursuant to this subchapter, that a public safety officer has died as the direct and proximate result of a personal injury sustained in the line of duty, the Bureau shall pay a benefit of $250,000, adjusted in accordance with subsection (h) of this section---- 4”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Winuk v. United States · Messick v. United States