Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 48 F.3d 610 - Stewart v. Coalter

Stewart v. Coalter’s Empirical Analysis

48 F.3d 610 · 1995

Citation profile

51
cited by 51 later decisions
3
states following
November 2023
most recently cited

28 federal appellate · 11 district · 6 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 51 later decisions — most recently November 2023 · most notably In the Interest of J.F.C. (2002), United States v. Lara (1999)

28 federal appellate · 11 district · 6 state decisions

2001995200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · Rochin v. People of California · Herrera v. Collins · Miller v. Fenton · O'NEAL v. McAninch

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 51 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[g]uilt beyond a reasonable doubt cannot be premised on pure conjecture.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[i]t makes no difference whether we . . . would as jurors have voted to acquit [the defendant] or whether we ourselves think that there is some reasonable doubt. The question posed by Jackson [v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979),] is whether 'any' rational jury could on the evidence presented think [the .38 caliber weapon was operable] so likely as to exclude all reasonable doubts. . . . A rational jury might well have acquitted without violating its oath; but, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution, a rational jury could also convict.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[i]f the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence of the crime charged, this court must reverse the conviction. This is so because ... where an equal or nearly equal theory of guilt and a theory of innocence is supported by the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.